Drill Case
Phishing Case
A reported invoice email: pull the deciding values out of its raw headers, and say what they establish.
The case
A user reported an email that asked them to approve an invoice. Before anyone decides whether it is a phish, someone has to read the headers.
Each question hands you a header block. Pull out the values a verdict turns on, then say what they do and do not prove.
What you will be able to do
- Extract SPF, DKIM and DMARC results from an Authentication-Results header and say what each one checked (Email Header Analyzer)
- Explain why a message can pass SPF and DKIM and still fail DMARC, using alignment
- Read a Received chain in the right direction, and separate the hops you can trust from the ones you cannot
- Recognize the case authentication cannot decide, and name the next source to go to
Read first: Email Header Analyzer.
Notes for teaching it
- Question 1 is the lesson. Both authentication checks pass and the verdict is still bad, which is the fastest way to explain alignment without a diagram.
- The p=none question is worth pausing on: a DMARC failure in a header does not mean the mail system did anything about it.
- The compromised-supplier question has no header-based answer on purpose. If a group tries to find one, that frustration is the point.
Terms behind it
- Email Header Analysis: Reading an email's full headers to trace origin and authentication.
- Sender Policy Framework: DNS record listing which servers may send mail for a domain.
- DomainKeys Identified Mail: A cryptographic signature proving an email wasn't altered in transit.
- Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance: A policy tying SPF and DKIM to the visible From and reporting failures.
- Business Email Compromise: Fraud that impersonates a trusted party in email to redirect money or data.
Worksheet
Every question on one page, to print or to read without JavaScript. The answer key has the answers and why.
All 8 questions
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Read the authentication results and pull out the three values a verdict turns on.
Authentication-Results: mx.example.org; spf=pass (sender IP is 203.0.113.47) smtp.mailfrom=bounce.marketing-host.example.net; dkim=pass header.d=marketing-host.example.net; dmarc=fail action=quarantine header.from=your-bank.example.com Return-Path: <bounce-4471@bounce.marketing-host.example.net> From: "Your Bank Security" <security@your-bank.example.com> Reply-To: security-team@mail-verify.example.net -
What does an SPF pass actually establish?
- That the sending IP is authorized to send for the envelope sender domain, which the recipient never sees
- That the message was sent by the person named in the From: header
- That the message content was not modified in transit
- That the sending domain is not spoofed
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Trace the Received chain. Pull out the address the message actually entered your infrastructure from, and the hop that is lying.
Received: from mx.example.org (mx.example.org [198.51.100.10]) by inbound.example.org with ESMTPS; Tue, 3 Mar 2026 09:14:22 +0000 Received: from smtp-out.sender-host.example.net (smtp-out.sender-host.example.net [203.0.113.88]) by mx.example.org with ESMTPS; Tue, 3 Mar 2026 09:14:19 +0000 Received: from your-bank.example.com (unknown [192.0.2.201]) by smtp-out.sender-host.example.net with SMTP; Tue, 3 Mar 2026 09:14:11 +0000 -
Pull out the three addresses a reply would actually involve.
From: "IT Service Desk" <helpdesk@example.com> Reply-To: it-support-desk@secure-helpdesk.example.net Return-Path: <noreply-7712@bulk.sender-host.example.net> To: staff-list@example.com Subject: Action required: your mailbox will be disabled
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Match each question to the header that answers it.
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A message from a supplier passes SPF, DKIM and DMARC, all aligned to the supplier's real domain. It asks to change the bank details on an invoice. What is the most likely explanation?
- The supplier's mailbox is compromised, and the message is genuinely from their infrastructure
- The authentication results were forged
- DMARC does not apply to internal-looking messages
- The message is legitimate, because all three checks aligned
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Pull out what DMARC decided, and what the domain owner asked to happen.
Authentication-Results: mx.example.org; spf=softfail smtp.mailfrom=example.com; dkim=none; dmarc=fail (p=none sp=none dis=none) header.from=example.com Received-SPF: softfail (example.com: domain of transitioning example.com does not designate 192.0.2.77 as permitted sender) -
Header analysis is done and the message is malicious. What is the highest-value next step for scoping?
- Search every mailbox for the Message-ID and the sending IP, to find who else received it
- Block the sending domain
- Report the domain to its registrar
- Extract the URLs and submit them for analysis
Next: Cloud Identity Case. All drills