CyberKit

Intel archive / Techniques and trends

TerminalFix: fake CAPTCHAs that get you to run commands

A fake 'verify you are human' box copies a command to your clipboard and asks you to paste it into Windows Terminal. The result is a backdoor with a tunnel into the network.

High severity. Active. High confidence. First reported 28 Aug 2026, last activity 2 Sep 2026. Briefing updated 27 Sep 2026.

AI-written summaries of public reporting, each checked against at least two sources from different publishers. Check the sources before you act. Last refreshed 2026-11-18 14:09 UTC. How this is made.

In plain words

What happened

A hacked website shows what looks like a Cloudflare 'I'm not a robot' check. It tells you to open Windows Terminal and paste something to prove you are human. The paste is the attack.

Who is behind it

Unnamed criminals, reported by Microsoft; a variant of the widespread 'ClickFix' trick.

What they want

A foothold inside company networks, not just one computer.

What they did

The pasted command downloads hidden files, installs a backdoor that survives reboots, maps the company network and opens a tunnel the attacker can reach internal systems through.

Who is at risk

Any Windows user who can open PowerShell or Terminal, which is most of them.

What to do

  • No real CAPTCHA ever asks you to paste anything into a terminal or Run box. Close the page.
  • If you already did it, disconnect and call your IT or security team.
The technical version, for hunting and patching

What happened

Microsoft (28 August 2026): a ClickFix variant using a spoofed Cloudflare Turnstile overlay that places a PowerShell one-liner on the clipboard and directs users to Windows Terminal, which runs multi-line scripts more reliably than Win+R.

Who is behind it

Unattributed; multilingual lures (English, Spanish, German).

What they want

Network-level access via a proxying implant for follow-on intrusion.

What they did

verify_pkg.zip to C:\ProgramData, then a batch file; DLL side-loading of dui70.dll by LockScreenContentServer.exe; payload fragments extracted from PNG pixel data; Run-key and 60-minute scheduled-task persistence; AD and domain-trust enumeration; file-watch C2; a Python reverse tunnel (client.py) to gitnow[.]dev:443 giving SOCKS-style access.

Who is at risk

Endpoints where standard users can run PowerShell unrestricted and Win+R/Terminal paste goes unmonitored.

What to do

  • Restrict PowerShell for standard users (AppLocker/WDAC), enforce Constrained Language Mode and script block logging.
  • Alert on LockScreenContentServer.exe outside C:\Windows\SystemApps and on Python processes making long-lived outbound TLS/WebSocket connections.
  • Enable Windows Terminal's multi-line paste warning; audit or block Win+R where unneeded.
  • If domain-joined hosts are hit, prioritize domain admin credential resets.

Actors

  • Unattributed (ClickFix ecosystem)

ATT&CK techniques

Sectors: Multiple. Regions: Global.

Open next

Sources

Revision history

  • 2026-09-27: First published.

Newer: Cisco FMC auth bypass used by state and ransomware actors. Older: UNC6671: helpdesk phone calls that end in SaaS data theft.