Intel archive / Techniques and trends
TerminalFix: fake CAPTCHAs that get you to run commands
A fake 'verify you are human' box copies a command to your clipboard and asks you to paste it into Windows Terminal. The result is a backdoor with a tunnel into the network.
High severity. Active. High confidence. First reported 28 Aug 2026, last activity 2 Sep 2026. Briefing updated 27 Sep 2026.
AI-written summaries of public reporting, each checked against at least two sources from different publishers. Check the sources before you act. Last refreshed 2026-11-18 14:09 UTC. How this is made.
In plain words
What happened
A hacked website shows what looks like a Cloudflare 'I'm not a robot' check. It tells you to open Windows Terminal and paste something to prove you are human. The paste is the attack.
Who is behind it
Unnamed criminals, reported by Microsoft; a variant of the widespread 'ClickFix' trick.
What they want
A foothold inside company networks, not just one computer.
What they did
The pasted command downloads hidden files, installs a backdoor that survives reboots, maps the company network and opens a tunnel the attacker can reach internal systems through.
Who is at risk
Any Windows user who can open PowerShell or Terminal, which is most of them.
What to do
- No real CAPTCHA ever asks you to paste anything into a terminal or Run box. Close the page.
- If you already did it, disconnect and call your IT or security team.
The technical version, for hunting and patching
What happened
Microsoft (28 August 2026): a ClickFix variant using a spoofed Cloudflare Turnstile overlay that places a PowerShell one-liner on the clipboard and directs users to Windows Terminal, which runs multi-line scripts more reliably than Win+R.
Who is behind it
Unattributed; multilingual lures (English, Spanish, German).
What they want
Network-level access via a proxying implant for follow-on intrusion.
What they did
verify_pkg.zip to C:\ProgramData, then a batch file; DLL side-loading of dui70.dll by LockScreenContentServer.exe; payload fragments extracted from PNG pixel data; Run-key and 60-minute scheduled-task persistence; AD and domain-trust enumeration; file-watch C2; a Python reverse tunnel (client.py) to gitnow[.]dev:443 giving SOCKS-style access.
Who is at risk
Endpoints where standard users can run PowerShell unrestricted and Win+R/Terminal paste goes unmonitored.
What to do
- Restrict PowerShell for standard users (AppLocker/WDAC), enforce Constrained Language Mode and script block logging.
- Alert on LockScreenContentServer.exe outside C:\Windows\SystemApps and on Python processes making long-lived outbound TLS/WebSocket connections.
- Enable Windows Terminal's multi-line paste warning; audit or block Win+R where unneeded.
- If domain-joined hosts are hit, prioritize domain admin credential resets.
Actors
- Unattributed (ClickFix ecosystem)
ATT&CK techniques
- T1204.004: User Execution
- T1059.001: Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1574.002: Hijack Execution Flow
- T1027.003: Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1053.005: Scheduled Task
- T1090: Proxy
Sectors: Multiple. Regions: Global.
Open next
Sources
- TerminalFix campaign deploys a reverse tunnel through multistage intrusion, Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-08-28 (vendor)
- Microsoft Warns TerminalFix Turns Fake CAPTCHA Checks Into Network Access, Redmond Magazine, 2026-09-02 (news)
- TerminalFix Campaign Targets Multiple Critical Sectors with ClickFix Variant, RH-ISAC (researcher)
Revision history
- 2026-09-27: First published.
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