Threat intel / Malware and ransomware
Trojanized Claude Code extension on Cursor marketplace plants SSH backdoor
A tampered build of the Claude Code extension on the Cursor marketplace tried to add an attacker SSH key and open a reverse tunnel. Anthropic says its own systems were not compromised.
High severity. Contained. Moderate confidence. First reported 30 Oct 2026, last activity 30 Oct 2026. Briefing updated 3 Nov 2026.
AI-written summaries of public reporting, each checked against at least two sources from different publishers. Check the sources before you act. Last refreshed 2026-11-18 14:09 UTC. How this is made.
What is not settled: Microsoft's findings come from reading the package, not from confirmed execution on every affected host. Cursor says errors and administrator requirements blocked most macOS and Windows installs, so real impact varies by machine. Outlets disagree on the exact window and on whether Open VSX was also affected, so this briefing gives no user count and no time range beyond what Microsoft and Cursor state. The second and third sources were checked from search summaries, not full articles.
In plain words
What happened
In late October 2026, the Cursor extension marketplace offered a tampered copy of the Claude Code extension for a short window. Anyone who installed or auto-updated it could get a program that tried to give an attacker remote access to their computer. Microsoft says the copy never reached Microsoft's or npm's extension channels.
Who is behind it
No threat actor is named. Microsoft does not attribute the activity to a group. Anthropic says it did not develop the package and that its systems were not compromised.
What they want
Remote access to developer machines. Microsoft does not state a motive, but the code adds an attacker-controlled SSH key and opens an outbound tunnel, which is what a remote access backdoor does.
What they did
The malicious code ran when the extension loaded. It collected basic host details and tried to add an SSH key, turn on SSH and open a reverse tunnel. It also wrote startup entries with names that look like monitoring tools. Errors were silently caught, so the extension kept working.
Who is at risk
Developers who installed or auto-updated the extension during the window, on macOS, Windows or Linux. Cursor reported that errors and administrator requirements blocked most macOS and Windows installs, but the loader could still plant keys and startup items.
What to do
- Check whether the Claude Code extension in Cursor is version 2.1.312 or 2.1.313. Review your extension install and update history for the window.
- Before cleaning up, save the extension package and startup files. Then check your SSH authorized_keys files for keys you did not add, and confirm each one before you remove it.
- Inspect startup items before you delete them, because the names can mislead. If you cannot confirm the machine is clean, rebuild it.
The technical version, for hunting and patching
What happened
A tampered copy of Anthropic's Claude Code extension (anthropic.claude-code), versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313, was distributed through the Cursor extension marketplace. Microsoft says the malicious packages were never published to the Visual Studio Marketplace or npm. Cursor reported that the package was available from about 2:27 AM to 1:35 PM PDT, and that it removed the version and then shut down the marketplace as a precaution.
Who is behind it
No threat actor is named. Microsoft's ATT&CK mappings describe what the code implements or attempts, not confirmed execution on every affected host. Anthropic says its systems were not compromised and that it did not develop the package.
What they want
Remote access through an attacker-controlled SSH key and a reverse SSH tunnel to attacker infrastructure. Microsoft does not state a motive.
What they did
Injected JavaScript runs when the extension module loads, before the normal extension code. It collects the hostname, username, OS and architecture, and lists the names (not values) of some environment variables. It attempts to add an attacker SSH key, enable the local SSH service and open a reverse SSH tunnel. It writes scripts and startup entries so the connection relaunches, disguised with monitoring-like names. A delayed callback reports the collected data.
Who is at risk
Developer workstations on Linux, macOS and Windows that installed or auto-updated versions 2.1.312 or 2.1.313 from the Cursor marketplace. The code runs on extension load, so a machine with the extension active is in scope even if the developer never uses the feature.
What to do
- Identify hosts that installed or auto-updated versions 2.1.312 or 2.1.313 from the Cursor marketplace, and preserve the extension package and related files before removal.
- Check user SSH authorization files, cron jobs and scheduled tasks for entries you did not create, then remove the unauthorized ones and stop any leftover SSH or retry processes.
- Isolate any host with evidence of loader execution, rotate credentials and revoke sessions if exposure is possible, and restrict Cursor extensions to approved publishers with an installation cooldown for new versions.
ATT&CK techniques
- T1098.004: Account Manipulation
- T1572: Protocol Tunneling
- T1053.003: Scheduled Task/Job
- T1053.005: Scheduled Task
Sectors: Technology. Regions: Global.
Open next
Sources
- Inside a malicious Claude Code-branded extension and its persistent SSH backdoor, Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-10-30 (vendor)
- Claude Code extension poisoned with persistent SSH backdoor, Help Net Security, 2026-10-30 (news)
- Malicious Claude Code extension on Cursor planted SSH backdoors, BleepingComputer (news)
Revision history
- 2026-11-03: First published.
Newer: CVE-2026-104935: Ivanti Connect Secure auth bypass exploited. Older: Leak of tens of thousands of DHS staff records, with an unconfirmed Okta claim.