T1014: Rootkit
Tactics: Stealth. Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows.
Malware that hides its own presence, and that of other tools, by hooking or modifying the OS at the user or kernel level.
Why it matters
Because rootkits subvert the very APIs investigators rely on, memory forensics (which bypasses the running OS) is essential to surface them.
In practice
A malicious kernel driver hides its files from the live OS but is plainly visible in a memory image.
MITRE's description
Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a hypervisor or System Firmware.
Telemetry that detects it
- Driver Load
- File Creation
- File Modification
- Module Load
- Process Creation
- Service Creation
D3FEND countermeasures
- D3-AVE: Asset Vulnerability Enumeration (Model)
- D3-CF: Content Filtering (Isolate)
- D3-CM: Content Modification (Isolate)
- D3-CQ: Content Quarantine (Isolate)
- D3-DF: Decoy File (Deceive)
- D3-FA: File Analysis (Detect)
- D3-FBA: Firmware Behavior Analysis (Detect)
- D3-FE: File Encryption (Harden)
- D3-FEMC: Firmware Embedded Monitoring Code (Detect)
- D3-FEV: File Eviction (Evict)
- D3-FIM: File Integrity Monitoring (Detect)
- D3-FV: Firmware Verification (Detect)
- D3-LFP: Local File Permissions (Isolate)
- D3-RF: Restore File (Restore)
- D3-RFAM: Remote File Access Mediation (Isolate)
- D3-RS: Restore Software (Restore)
- D3-SU: Software Update (Harden)
- D3-SWI: Software Inventory (Model)
Groups documented using it
APT28, Winnti Group, APT41, Rocke, TeamTNT, UNC3886
Procedure examples
- APT28 has used a UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) rootkit known as LoJax.
- APT41 deployed rootkits on Linux systems.
- ArcaneDoor included hooking the processHostScanReply() function on victim Cisco ASA devices.
- COATHANGER hooks or replaces multiple legitimate processes and other functions on victim devices.
32 documented uses in all. These are a sample.
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise 19.2. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation.