T1025: Data from Removable Media
Tactics: Collection. Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows.
Adversaries may search connected removable media on computers they have compromised to find files of interest.
MITRE's description
Adversaries may search connected removable media on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within cmd may be used to gather information. Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on removable media.
Telemetry that detects it
- Drive Creation
- File Access
- Process Creation
Mitigations
- Data Loss Prevention
- Data loss prevention can restrict access to sensitive data and detect sensitive data that is unencrypted.
D3FEND countermeasures
- D3-HCI: Hardware Component Inventory (Model)
- D3-IOPR: IO Port Restriction (Isolate)
- D3-RH: Radiation Hardening (Harden)
Groups documented using it
APT28, Turla, Gamaredon Group, OilRig
Procedure examples
- An APT28 backdoor may collect the entire contents of an inserted USB device.
- AppleSeed can find and collect data from removable media devices.
- Aria-body has the ability to collect data from USB devices.
- BADNEWS copies files with certain extensions from USB devices to a predefined directory.
24 documented uses in all. These are a sample.
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise 19.2. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation.