CyberKit

ATT&CK map

T1573: Encrypted Channel

Tactics: Command and Control. Platforms: ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows.

Encrypting command-and-control traffic (with standard TLS or a custom scheme) to conceal its content.

Why it matters

Payloads are hidden, so detection shifts to metadata: JA3/JA4 fingerprints, certificate oddities, and beacon timing.

In practice

C2 traffic is wrapped in TLS with a self-signed certificate, so only the metadata is visible.

MITRE's description

Adversaries may employ an encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.

Telemetry that detects it

  • Application Log Content
  • Module Load
  • Network Connection Creation
  • Network Traffic Content
  • Network Traffic Flow
  • Process Creation

Mitigations

Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network…
SSL/TLS Inspection
SSL/TLS inspection can be used to see the contents of encrypted sessions to look for network-based indicators of malware communication protocols.

D3FEND countermeasures

  • D3-APCA: Application Protocol Command Analysis (Detect)
  • D3-CSPP: Client-server Payload Profiling (Detect)
  • D3-NTCD: Network Traffic Community Deviation (Detect)
  • D3-NTF: Network Traffic Filtering (Isolate)
  • D3-NTSA: Network Traffic Signature Analysis (Detect)
  • D3-OTF: Outbound Traffic Filtering (Isolate)
  • D3-PHDURA: Per Host Download-Upload Ratio Analysis (Detect)
  • D3-PMAD: Protocol Metadata Anomaly Detection (Detect)
  • D3-RPA: Relay Pattern Analysis (Detect)
  • D3-RTSD: Remote Terminal Session Detection (Detect)
  • D3-UGLPA: User Geolocation Logon Pattern Analysis (Detect)

Groups documented using it

BITTER

Procedure examples

  • APT29 has used multiple layers of encryption within malware to protect C2 communication.
  • BITTER has encrypted their C2 communications.
  • Chaes has used encryption for its C2 channel.
  • Cryptoistic can engage in encrypted communications with C2.

17 documented uses in all. These are a sample.

T1573 on attack.mitre.org

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise 19.2. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation.