T1677: Poisoned Pipeline Execution
Tactics: Execution. Platforms: SaaS.
Adversaries may manipulate continuous integration / continuous development (CI/CD) processes by injecting malicious code into the build process.
MITRE's description
Adversaries may manipulate continuous integration / continuous development (CI/CD) processes by injecting malicious code into the build process. There are several mechanisms for poisoning pipelines: In a <b>Direct Pipeline Execution</b> scenario, the threat actor directly modifies the CI configuration file (e.g., gitlab-ci.yml in GitLab). They may include a command to exfiltrate credentials leveraged in the build process to a remote server, or to export them as a workflow artifact.
Telemetry that detects it
- Cloud Service Metadata
- Cloud Service Modification
- Cloud Storage Access
- Command Execution
- File Metadata
Mitigations
- User Account Management
- Ensure that CI/CD pipelines only have permissions they require to complete their operations.
- Software Configuration
- Where possible, avoid allowing pipelines to run unreviewed code. Where this is necessary, ensure that these pipelines are executed on isolated nodes without access to secrets.
Procedure examples
- CanisterWorm has leveraged stolen tokens from Trivy users to publish itself across over 46 npm packages.
- Mini Shai-Hulud has utilized Github Actions to propagate through the use of triggered workflows.
- Shai-Hulud has also leveraged GitHub actions from stolen accounts in order to create a malicious Github workflow within .github/workflows/discussion.yaml.
- TeamPCP has compromised trusted CI/CD pipelines by injecting credential-stealing payloads into legitimate workflows and software packages including open-source security tools Trivy and KICS, and AI gateway LiteLLM.
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise 19.2. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation.