CyberKit

ATT&CK map

T1677: Poisoned Pipeline Execution

Tactics: Execution. Platforms: SaaS.

Adversaries may manipulate continuous integration / continuous development (CI/CD) processes by injecting malicious code into the build process.

MITRE's description

Adversaries may manipulate continuous integration / continuous development (CI/CD) processes by injecting malicious code into the build process. There are several mechanisms for poisoning pipelines: In a <b>Direct Pipeline Execution</b> scenario, the threat actor directly modifies the CI configuration file (e.g., gitlab-ci.yml in GitLab). They may include a command to exfiltrate credentials leveraged in the build process to a remote server, or to export them as a workflow artifact.

Telemetry that detects it

  • Cloud Service Metadata
  • Cloud Service Modification
  • Cloud Storage Access
  • Command Execution
  • File Metadata

Mitigations

User Account Management
Ensure that CI/CD pipelines only have permissions they require to complete their operations.
Software Configuration
Where possible, avoid allowing pipelines to run unreviewed code. Where this is necessary, ensure that these pipelines are executed on isolated nodes without access to secrets.

Procedure examples

  • CanisterWorm has leveraged stolen tokens from Trivy users to publish itself across over 46 npm packages.
  • Mini Shai-Hulud has utilized Github Actions to propagate through the use of triggered workflows.
  • Shai-Hulud has also leveraged GitHub actions from stolen accounts in order to create a malicious Github workflow within .github/workflows/discussion.yaml.
  • TeamPCP has compromised trusted CI/CD pipelines by injecting credential-stealing payloads into legitimate workflows and software packages including open-source security tools Trivy and KICS, and AI gateway LiteLLM.

T1677 on attack.mitre.org

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise 19.2. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation.