capa Namespaces
How to read a capa report, and how much weight each namespace deserves.
capa answers what a binary can do, from static analysis, and files what it finds under a namespace tree. Learning the namespaces is most of learning to read a report.
A matched rule is a fact about the code, not about behavior. Capability to inject is not proof it injected.
14 rows.
| Namespace | What it detects |
|---|---|
| anti-analysis | Obfuscation, packing, anti-debugging, anti-VM and anti-disassembly. |
| persistence | Registry run keys, services, scheduled tasks, startup folders, COM hijacking. |
| collection | Keylogging, screen capture, credential and browser data access, microphone and webcam. |
| communication | HTTP, DNS, TCP, UDP, FTP, sockets, named pipes, and C2-shaped exchanges. |
| host-interaction | Everything the binary does to the machine: processes, threads, files, registry, services, drivers, the shell. |
| data-manipulation | Encryption, encoding, hashing, checksums, compression and random number generation. |
| load-code | Loading and executing code that was not in the original image: shellcode, PEs, .NET assemblies. |
| impact | The end goal: remote access, backdoors, destruction. |
| exploitation | Behavior associated with exploiting a vulnerability. |
| executable | Properties of the file format itself: PE structure, ELF structure, embedded subfiles, resources. |
| compiler / runtime / linking | Which toolchain produced the binary, which runtime it needs, and how it was linked. |
| malware-family | Rules that recognize a specific named family. |
| nursery | Rules that are not yet mature enough for the main collection. |
| lib / internal | Building blocks other rules depend on, and capa's own bookkeeping. |