CyberKit

Entra ID Sign-ins

AADSTS result codes and risk detections, read as investigative signals.

Microsoft's AADSTS reference is written for developers fixing an app. Reading a tenant's sign-in log after an incident is a different job. Thirty 50126 failures against thirty users is a password spray, not thirty typos.

Before you read the table

  • Successful sign-ins carry risk detections too. A success flagged atypical travel is more urgent than any failure on the page.
  • The authentication requirement field proves MFA. A policy existing does not. singleFactorAuthentication means MFA was not satisfied.

26 rows.

Entra ID sign-in codes
CodeMeaningInvestigative use
50126Error validating credentials due to invalid username or password.The workhorse failure code, and the one password spraying is made of. A single occurrence is a typo; the same code against many DIFFERENT user principal names from one IP or one ASN, a few attempts per account, is a spray.
50053Account is locked because the user tried to sign in too many times with an incorrect ID or password (smart lockout).Proof that the volume against a single account crossed Entra's own threshold. Useful in two directions: it confirms a brute-force attempt, and it explains a wave of user-reported lockouts that would otherwise look like an outage.
50034The user account does not exist in the directory.User enumeration. An attacker is testing a list of guessed or harvested addresses to learn which ones are real before spending attempts on passwords. The valid names are the ones that come back with 50126 instead.
50057User account is disabled.Usually a stale credential list: an attacker working from a breach dump or an old export that still contains leavers. Tells you the source data is old, which is a useful attribution detail.
50055The password is expired.Notable only because it means the password supplied was OTHERWISE CORRECT. In a spray investigation this is a hit, not a miss. The credential is valid and the attacker now knows it.
50133Session is invalid due to expiration or recent password change.Expected noise after a password reset, including the reset YOU performed during containment. Useful for confirming that a revocation actually took effect.
500121Authentication failed during strong authentication request.The MFA-fatigue code. It covers a denied push, a timed-out prompt, and a user who simply did not respond, so a repeated run of it against one account means someone holds a valid password and is pushing prompts at a person who keeps refusing. The dangerous moment is the FIRST success after a run of these: that is the prompt the user finally approved.
50074User did not pass the MFA challenge (strong authentication required).The password was accepted and MFA stopped the sign-in. Every occurrence is a credential you should now consider known to someone else: the control worked, but the secret is still burned.
50076Due to a configuration change made by the administrator, or because the user moved to a new location, the user must use multi-factor authentication.Routine when a Conditional Access policy fires on a new network. Suspicious when the "new location" is somewhere the user has never been and never travels to.
50079The user is required to enroll in multi-factor authentication (proof-up required).Dangerous when it appears on an account that should ALREADY have MFA. An attacker with a valid password reaching an un-enrolled account gets to register their own authenticator, which converts a stolen password into durable access that survives a reset.
53003Access has been blocked by Conditional Access policies.A control fired. The question is always which policy and why: the sign-in log names the policy, so this is a rare case where the log tells you exactly what saved you. A run of these from one identity is someone probing for a path the policy set does not cover.
53000Device is not compliant; the user must enroll or remediate.A correct password arriving from an unmanaged device. Legitimate for a user on a new laptop, and exactly what a credential thief looks like. The distinguishing evidence is elsewhere (location, user agent, whether the real user was working).
53001Device is not domain joined.Same reading as 53000. The credential was accepted, the endpoint was not.
53002The application used is not an approved application for Conditional Access.Frequently an attacker choosing a legacy or non-standard client on purpose, because approved-app policies are one of the controls that legacy protocols bypass.
50097Device authentication is required.Common in hybrid-join environments. Read alongside 53000/53001 rather than on its own.
50158External security challenge was not satisfied.A third-party or external MFA/challenge provider rejected the sign-in, so the corroborating evidence lives in that provider's logs, not in Entra's.
65001The user or administrator has not consented to use the application.The footprint of an illicit consent-grant attempt. A user was sent to a real Microsoft consent screen for an attacker-registered application; the code means they had not (yet) agreed. The follow-up question is whether a later attempt succeeded: a granted consent produces no failure code at all, only an audit-log entry.
90094The grant requires administrator permissions.An application asked for permissions only an admin can grant. Mailbox-wide or directory-wide scopes. Legitimate for enterprise software rollouts, and precisely what a serious consent-phishing attempt looks like. Read the requested scopes, not the app's display name, which the attacker chose.
7000215Invalid client secret provided.A workload identity failing to authenticate. Routine after a secret rotation and alarming otherwise: someone is trying secrets against a service principal, and service principals frequently hold broader permissions than any human account and are excluded from MFA by nature.
700016Application with the given identifier was not found in the directory.Often an attacker probing for the presence of a well-known first-party or third-party app ID in the tenant, or a stale integration. Read as reconnaissance when it comes in a burst of distinct app IDs.
50105The signed-in user is not assigned to a role for the application.Authentication succeeded; authorization did not. The identity is valid, which makes this a confirmation of compromise rather than a failed attempt, if the user had no reason to touch that app.
50173Fresh authentication token is required. The password has changed.Confirms a password change invalidated an existing session. During containment this is the code that proves your reset actually took effect.
50058A silent sign-in request was sent but no user is signed in.Ordinary browser/SSO behavior. Almost never meaningful on its own; useful only for reconstructing a session's shape.
50140The sign-in was interrupted by the "Keep me signed in" prompt.Interactive-session furniture. Its value is confirming a human was at a browser rather than a script.
16000User account selection is required. The session has multiple accounts.Noise in shared or multi-tenant browsers; not a security signal.
90002Tenant not found.Someone is authenticating against a tenant identifier that does not exist here, typically a misdirected integration, occasionally reconnaissance across tenant names.

Related

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