CyberKit

Event IDs

Security event 4616

The system time was changed

Channel: Security. Category: System (Audit Security State Change).

What it records

Generated every time the system clock is changed, and is always logged regardless of whether the Security State Change subcategory is itself audited. Records the Subject that requested the change, the Process ID and Name of the process that made it, and both the Previous Time and New Time in UTC.

Why it matters

Direct evidence of system-clock manipulation: a known anti-forensic technique that skews the timestamps on every event subsequently written to the log, complicating timeline reconstruction and cross-log correlation. Microsoft's own guidance says this is normally the Windows Time service (running as LOCAL SERVICE, hosted in svchost.exe) making small periodic corrections, so a 4616 attributed to any other account or an unexpected Process Name is worth immediate scrutiny.

What triggers it

Legitimately, almost universally: the Windows Time service (w32time, hosted in svchost.exe, Subject LOCAL SERVICE) applying small periodic NTP corrections, or an automatic daylight-saving/timezone adjustment. Anomalously: an attacker or user with sufficient privilege manually changing the clock (backward to make freshly created evidence look older, or jumping it around to scatter subsequent events across a confusing timeline) to throw off timeline-based correlation.

Fields that carry the answer

Key fields
FieldWhat it tells you
Account Name (Subject)Who/what requested the change. Microsoft's guidance is to flag anything other than LOCAL SERVICE.
Process NameThe executable that made the change. Microsoft flags anything other than svchost.exe (the Windows Time service's host process) as worth reviewing.
Previous Time / New TimeThe before/after UTC timestamps: the size and direction of the jump (a sub-second NTP correction vs. a large manual jump backward or forward) is the key signal for distinguishing routine sync from tampering.

In practice

The Windows Time service (Subject LOCAL SERVICE, Process Name svchost.exe) applies a sub-second NTP correction, Previous Time and New Time differing by under a second. Routine. The same event with Subject CORP\jdoe, Process Name powershell.exe, and New Time set several hours behind Previous Time, immediately before a burst of file modifications, points to an attacker rolling the clock back to make new activity appear to predate the intrusion.

Sample record

The system time was changed.

Subject:
	Security ID:		S-1-5-19
	Account Name:		LOCAL SERVICE
	Account Domain:		NT AUTHORITY
	Logon ID:		0x3E5

Process Information:
	Process ID:		0x358
	Name:		C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe

Previous Time:		2026-07-09T04:59:59.998104200Z
New Time:		2026-07-09T05:00:00.000000000Z

Sources

Paste a record into Event XML or open a log in EVTX Reader.