CyberKit

Event IDs

Security event 4648

A logon was attempted using explicit credentials

Channel: Security. Category: Logon/Logoff (Audit Logon).

What it records

Logged when a process explicitly specifies a different account's credentials to start a new logon, rather than using the current session's identity. Records both the originating account (Subject) and the account whose credentials were used, plus the target server and process.

Why it matters

One of the clearer indicators of credential reuse and lateral movement (RunAs, scheduled tasks, PsExec-style remote execution, mapping a resource with alternate credentials). Reviewing the process name together with the target account and network address can reveal unauthorized use of privileged credentials.

What triggers it

Most commonly occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks or the RUNAS command, and is a routine event during normal OS activity, but also generated by lateral-movement tooling authenticating with harvested credentials.

Fields that carry the answer

Key fields
FieldWhat it tells you
Account Name (Subject)The account/process that initiated the alternate-credential logon: the 'who ran the RunAs'.
Account Name (Account Whose Credentials Were Used)The, often different and sometimes privileged, account whose credentials were actually presented: the core signal for credential reuse and lateral movement.
Target Server NameWhere the explicit-credential logon was aimed ('localhost' for a local RunAs), which shows the destination of the reused credentials.
Process NameThe process that performed the explicit-credential logon, e.g. mmc.exe for a routine RunAs, or lateral-movement tooling for an attack.
Network AddressSource IP for the logon attempt, relevant when the explicit-credential logon reached out over the network rather than staying local.

In practice

Logged when a process authenticates using alternate, explicitly supplied credentials - for example a helpdesk workstation running 'runas /user:CORP\svc_backup' or PsExec supplying separate credentials to connect to a target at 192.0.2.50. Because it records both the initiating account and the account whose credentials were used, it's a key signal for lateral movement with stolen or saved credentials.

Sample record

A logon was attempted using explicit credentials.

Subject:
	Security ID:		S-1-5-21-3623811015-3361044348-30300820-1104
	Account Name:		jsmith
	Account Domain:		CORP
	Logon ID:		0x3E7F2A1
	Logon GUID:		{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}

Account Whose Credentials Were Used:
	Account Name:		svc_backup
	Account Domain:		CORP
	Logon GUID:		{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}

Target Server:
	Target Server Name:	fileserver01.corp.example.com
	Additional Information:	fileserver01.corp.example.com

Process Information:
	Process ID:		0x1a4
	Process Name:		C:\Windows\System32\mmc.exe

Network Information:
	Network Address:	203.0.113.20
	Port:			0

Sources

Paste a record into Event XML or open a log in EVTX Reader.