Security event 4656
A handle to an object was requested
Channel: Security. Category: Object Access (Audit File System / Audit Kernel Object / Audit Registry / Audit Removable Storage).
What it records
Logged the first time a process requests a handle to a file, registry key, or other securable object that has a SACL configured for the requested access type, recording the requested access rights (Access List/Access Mask) and whether the request was granted (Success) or refused (Failure).
Why it matters
Marks the start of an access sequence against a monitored object. Essential for identifying who first touched a sensitive file/registry key and what access rights (read vs. write vs. delete) they asked for; its Handle ID is the correlation key that ties it to the later 4658 (close), 4660 (delete), and 4663 (access performed) events for the same object.
What triggers it
Any application opening a file, registry key, or removable-storage object for which the object's SACL audits that account/access type. Requires the object to have auditing explicitly configured. It isn't blanket logging.
Fields that carry the answer
| Field | What it tells you |
|---|---|
| Object Name | Full path/name of the file, registry key, or other object a handle was requested to: the core artifact identity for tracking access to a sensitive resource. |
| Accesses (Access List) | The specific access rights requested (ReadData, WriteData, Delete, WRITE_DAC, etc.), which shows intent (read vs. write vs. delete) before any operation is confirmed via 4663. |
| Handle ID | Correlation key linking this handle-open to the later 4658 (close), 4660 (delete), and 4663 (access performed) events for the same object. |
| Process Name | The process that requested access, which identifies what opened the object. |
| Privileges Used for Access Check | Any sensitive privilege (e.g. SeBackupPrivilege, SeRestorePrivilege) invoked to obtain the access, which flags a backup/restore-privilege bypass of normal file ACLs. |
In practice
Logged when a process requests a handle to a SACL-audited securable object - for example CORP\jsmith's Explorer process requesting read/write access to \\FS01\Finance\Payroll.xlsx. It records the requested Access Mask before access is granted, and per Microsoft's file-system auditing guidance is typically read alongside the paired 4663 that confirms which of the requested accesses were actually used.
Sample record
A handle to an object was requested.
Subject:
Security ID: S-1-5-21-3457937927-2839227994-823803824-1104
Account Name: jdoe
Account Domain: CORP
Logon ID: 0x3E4B2
Object:
Object Server: Security
Object Type: File
Object Name: C:\Finance\Q3_Report.xlsx
Handle ID: 0x0
Resource Attributes: S:AI
Process Information:
Process ID: 0x1A4C
Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe
Access Request Information:
Transaction ID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}
Accesses: READ_CONTROL
SYNCHRONIZE
ReadAttributes
ReadData (or ListDirectory)
Access Reasons: READ_CONTROL: Granted by D:(A;;RC;;;WD)
SYNCHRONIZE: Granted by D:(A;;0x100000;;;WD)
ReadAttributes: Granted by D:(A;;0x80;;;WD)
ReadData (or ListDirectory): Granted by D:(A;;0x1;;;WD)
Access Mask: 0x120089
Privileges Used for Access Check: -
Restricted SID Count: 0Sources
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