CyberKit

Event IDs

Security event 4661

A handle to an object was requested

Channel: Security. Category: DS Access (Audit Directory Service Access) / Object Access (Audit SAM).

What it records

Generated when a handle is requested to either an Active Directory object (on a domain controller) or a Security Account Manager (SAM) object (a local group, group, user account, domain, or computer account) recording the requesting Subject, the Object Type/Name, and the specific access rights requested. A Failure event means the requested access was declined; it only generates if Success auditing is enabled for the Audit Handle Manipulation subcategory.

Why it matters

This is the event that captures the opening move of SAM/AD object enumeration: remote SAM access: the kind performed by tools like Impacket's secretsdump.py or samrdump, and directory-object access both begin by requesting a handle, making 4661 a leading indicator of credential-dumping reconnaissance. Because opening a handle to a domain naming-context object with the Control Access right is also the first step toward abusing DS-Replication-Get-Changes (DCSync), a 4661 against a SAM_DOMAIN/directory object from an account with no legitimate replication role is worth escalating, though the specific extended-right GUID that confirms DCSync is carried on the companion event, 4662.

What triggers it

Legitimately: extremely high volume: any normal SAM/AD read (Active Directory Users and Computers, PowerShell AD cmdlets, logon processing) requests object handles constantly, which is why Microsoft doesn't recommend broadly monitoring this event on its own. Anomalously: remote SAM enumeration/dumping tools requesting handles to SAM_DOMAIN or SAM_USER objects, or a non-replication account requesting Control Access to a domain object as part of a DCSync attempt.

Fields that carry the answer

Key fields
FieldWhat it tells you
Object Type / Object NameSAM_DOMAIN, SAM_USER, SAM_ALIAS, SAM_GROUP, or SAM_SERVER for SAM objects (a distinguished name for AD objects), which identifies exactly what was targeted.
Accesses / Access MaskThe specific rights requested. Control Access (0x100) requested against a domain object is the flag to watch for replication-right abuse.
Account Name (Subject)Who requested the handle: an account with no administrative or replication role requesting SAM/domain-object handles is the anomaly to chase.
Handle IDCorrelates this event to the follow-on operation performed on the same object, e.g. the matching 4662.

In practice

CORP\svc-backup, an account with no AD-replication role, requests a handle to Object Type SAM_DOMAIN, Object Name DC=corp,DC=example,DC=local, with Access Mask including Control Access (0x100), from a member server rather than a domain controller. Paired with a matching 4662 on the same object showing the DS-Replication-Get-Changes extended right, this is the signature of a DCSync-style credential-dumping attempt.

Sample record

Log Name:	Security
Source:	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
Event ID:	4661
Task Category:	SAM
Level:	Information
Keywords:	Audit Success
User:	N/A
Computer:	DC01.corp.example.local
Description:
A handle to an object was requested.

Subject:
	Security ID:		CORP\svc-backup
	Account Name:		svc-backup
	Account Domain:		CORP
	Logon ID:		0x4280E

Object:
	Object Server:		Security Account Manager
	Object Type:		SAM_DOMAIN
	Object Name:		DC=corp,DC=example,DC=local
	Handle ID:		0xdd64d36870

Process Information:
	Process ID:		0x9a4
	Process Name:		C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe

Access Request Information:
	Accesses:		Control Access
	Access Mask:		0x100

ATT&CK techniques

Sources

Paste a record into Event XML or open a log in EVTX Reader.