Security event 4661
A handle to an object was requested
Channel: Security. Category: DS Access (Audit Directory Service Access) / Object Access (Audit SAM).
What it records
Generated when a handle is requested to either an Active Directory object (on a domain controller) or a Security Account Manager (SAM) object (a local group, group, user account, domain, or computer account) recording the requesting Subject, the Object Type/Name, and the specific access rights requested. A Failure event means the requested access was declined; it only generates if Success auditing is enabled for the Audit Handle Manipulation subcategory.
Why it matters
This is the event that captures the opening move of SAM/AD object enumeration: remote SAM access: the kind performed by tools like Impacket's secretsdump.py or samrdump, and directory-object access both begin by requesting a handle, making 4661 a leading indicator of credential-dumping reconnaissance. Because opening a handle to a domain naming-context object with the Control Access right is also the first step toward abusing DS-Replication-Get-Changes (DCSync), a 4661 against a SAM_DOMAIN/directory object from an account with no legitimate replication role is worth escalating, though the specific extended-right GUID that confirms DCSync is carried on the companion event, 4662.
What triggers it
Legitimately: extremely high volume: any normal SAM/AD read (Active Directory Users and Computers, PowerShell AD cmdlets, logon processing) requests object handles constantly, which is why Microsoft doesn't recommend broadly monitoring this event on its own. Anomalously: remote SAM enumeration/dumping tools requesting handles to SAM_DOMAIN or SAM_USER objects, or a non-replication account requesting Control Access to a domain object as part of a DCSync attempt.
Fields that carry the answer
| Field | What it tells you |
|---|---|
| Object Type / Object Name | SAM_DOMAIN, SAM_USER, SAM_ALIAS, SAM_GROUP, or SAM_SERVER for SAM objects (a distinguished name for AD objects), which identifies exactly what was targeted. |
| Accesses / Access Mask | The specific rights requested. Control Access (0x100) requested against a domain object is the flag to watch for replication-right abuse. |
| Account Name (Subject) | Who requested the handle: an account with no administrative or replication role requesting SAM/domain-object handles is the anomaly to chase. |
| Handle ID | Correlates this event to the follow-on operation performed on the same object, e.g. the matching 4662. |
In practice
CORP\svc-backup, an account with no AD-replication role, requests a handle to Object Type SAM_DOMAIN, Object Name DC=corp,DC=example,DC=local, with Access Mask including Control Access (0x100), from a member server rather than a domain controller. Paired with a matching 4662 on the same object showing the DS-Replication-Get-Changes extended right, this is the signature of a DCSync-style credential-dumping attempt.
Sample record
Log Name: Security Source: Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing Event ID: 4661 Task Category: SAM Level: Information Keywords: Audit Success User: N/A Computer: DC01.corp.example.local Description: A handle to an object was requested. Subject: Security ID: CORP\svc-backup Account Name: svc-backup Account Domain: CORP Logon ID: 0x4280E Object: Object Server: Security Account Manager Object Type: SAM_DOMAIN Object Name: DC=corp,DC=example,DC=local Handle ID: 0xdd64d36870 Process Information: Process ID: 0x9a4 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe Access Request Information: Accesses: Control Access Access Mask: 0x100
ATT&CK techniques
Sources
Paste a record into Event XML or open a log in EVTX Reader.