Security event 4662
An operation was performed on an object
Channel: Security. Category: DS Access (Audit Directory Service Access).
What it records
Generated on a domain controller every time an operation is performed against an Active Directory object whose SACL is configured to audit it, which captures the object's type and distinguished name, the operation performed, the specific access rights used (Accesses/Access Mask), and the Properties field listing the GUIDs of the specific attributes or extended rights involved. One 4662 is generated per operation type performed.
Why it matters
Because the Properties field records the exact extended-right GUIDs exercised against an object, 4662 is the canonical way to catch DCSync: a replication request that invokes the DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All extended rights against a domain naming context, normally reserved for domain controllers and a small set of privileged replication accounts. Any other account successfully exercising those rights is a strong signal of credential-dumping via directory replication.
What triggers it
Legitimately, normal Active Directory replication between domain controllers, or any properly permissioned directory operation against a SACL-audited object. Maliciously, a compromised account with (or granted) DCSync-capable rights using a tool such as Mimikatz's lsadump::dcsync or Impacket's secretsdump.py to request replication of password hashes, or other extended-rights abuse against a sensitive AD object.
Fields that carry the answer
| Field | What it tells you |
|---|---|
| Object Name | Distinguished name of the AD object the operation targeted, for DCSync this is the domain naming context DN (e.g. DC=corp,DC=local), not a single user object. |
| Object Type | Class of the accessed object (e.g. domainDNS), which confirms the operation targeted the domain object itself. |
| Properties | GUID(s) of the specific extended right(s) or attributes exercised, which DS-Replication-Get-Changes ({1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}) together with DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All ({1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}) against a domain object is the DCSync signature. |
| Account Name (Subject) | The account that performed the operation, for DCSync, an account with no legitimate replication role (i.e. not a domain controller's own account or an authorized replication service account). |
| Accesses | The type of access exercised. 'Control Access' is what extended-rights operations like DCSync use. |
In practice
Logged on a domain controller when an account exercises the DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All extended rights against the domain object DC=corp,DC=local. If Account Name is CORP\svc-web (a service account with no legitimate replication role) rather than a domain controller's own computer account, that pairing of Properties GUIDs against a domain naming context is the standard DCSync indicator.
Sample record
An operation was performed on an object.
Subject:
Security ID: CORP\svc-web
Account Name: svc-web
Account Domain: CORP
Logon ID: 0x8A2C1
Object:
Object Server: DS
Object Type: domainDNS
Object Name: DC=corp,DC=local
Handle ID: 0x0
Operation:
Operation Type: Object Access
Accesses: Control Access
Access Mask: 0x100
Properties: Control Access
{1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2} (DS-Replication-Get-Changes)
{1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2} (DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All)
Additional Information:
Parameter 1: -
Parameter 2: -ATT&CK techniques
- T1003.006: T1003.006
Sources
Paste a record into Event XML or open a log in EVTX Reader.