Security event 4670
Permissions on an object were changed
Channel: Security. Category: Object Access (Audit File System / Audit Registry); Policy Change (Audit Authentication Policy Change / Audit Authorization Policy Change).
What it records
Generated when the DACL (permissions) on a file system, registry, or security-token object is changed, recording the Subject who made the change and both the Original and New Security Descriptor in SDDL. It does not fire on SACL (auditing-ACL) changes, and needs 'Change Permissions'/'Take Ownership' (files) or 'Write DAC'/'Write Owner' (registry) set in the object's own SACL before it will generate.
Why it matters
The Original/New Security Descriptor pair is a rare artifact that shows exactly which ACE was added or removed on a specific file or registry key: the mechanism behind permission-based persistence backdoors, such as granting a low-privileged account write access to a sensitive registry key or high-value file. Microsoft explicitly calls out monitoring 4670 on a domain controller's ntds.dit file as a use case, since an unexpected permissions change to the AD database file itself is a serious tampering indicator; note that ACL changes on Active Directory objects themselves (e.g. AdminSDHolder) are captured separately, via 5136.
What triggers it
Legitimately: an administrator deliberately changing permissions on a file or registry key (sharing a folder, hardening a key), or software installers adjusting ACLs during setup. Maliciously: an attacker with sufficient access modifying the DACL on a sensitive file or registry key to grant themselves or another account persistent access, as part of a broader privilege-escalation or persistence chain.
Fields that carry the answer
| Field | What it tells you |
|---|---|
| Object Name | The file, registry key, or object whose permissions changed. Cross-reference against a known-sensitive-object list (e.g. ntds.dit, security-tool binaries, autorun keys). |
| Object Type | Distinguishes a file, registry key (Key), or Token object change. Token-object changes are largely informational, while File/Key changes on high-value objects are the ones worth alerting on. |
| Original Security Descriptor / New Security Descriptor | The before/after SDDL strings. Diff them to see exactly which account (SID) gained or lost which right; a new ACE granting an unexpected SID Full Control (FA) is the primary red flag. |
| Process Name | The process that made the change: an unfamiliar process, or one outside System32/Program Files, changing permissions on a sensitive object is worth escalating. |
In practice
On a domain controller, the DACL on ntds.dit changes via Process Name dllhost.exe, with the New Security Descriptor granting an unexpected SID Full Control (FA) that wasn't present in the Original Security Descriptor. A permissions change on that specific file outside a planned backup or restore operation is a strong indicator of an attempt to tamper with or later exfiltrate the AD database.
Sample record
Log Name: Security Source: Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing Event ID: 4670 Task Category: File System Level: Information Keywords: Audit Success User: N/A Computer: DC01.corp.example.local Description: Permissions on an object were changed. Subject: Security ID: CORP\jsmith Account Name: jsmith Account Domain: CORP Logon ID: 0x43659 Object: Object Server: Security Object Type: File Object Name: C:\Windows\NTDS\ntds.dit Handle ID: 0x3f0 Process Information: Process ID: 0xdb0 Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe Permissions Change: Original Security Descriptor: D:AI(A;OICIID;FA;;;SY)(A;OICIID;FA;;;BA) New Security Descriptor: D:ARAI(A;OICI;FA;;;WD)(A;OICIID;FA;;;SY)(A;OICIID;FA;;;BA)
ATT&CK techniques
- T1222.001: T1222.001
Sources
Paste a record into Event XML or open a log in EVTX Reader.