Security event 4704
A user right was assigned
Channel: Security. Category: Audit Authorization Policy Change.
What it records
Generated every time the local user rights policy changes and a user right is assigned to an account: a separate event fires per right/account combination. Records the Subject who made the change, the Target Account the right was assigned to, and the specific privilege in the New Right\User Right field (e.g. SeDebugPrivilege, SeServiceLogonRight).
Why it matters
User rights (distinct from NTFS/object permissions) govern powerful, system-wide capabilities like debugging other processes, acting as part of the OS, or logging on as a service, so a 4704 granting a sensitive right like SeDebugPrivilege or SeTcbPrivilege to a non-administrative or unexpected account is a strong privilege-escalation or persistence signal. Microsoft's own guidance recommends flagging every 4704 whose Subject isn't SYSTEM, since routine GPO-driven rights assignment is normally applied by SYSTEM rather than an interactive user. Note it only covers *user* rights (the 'User Rights Assignment' privileges): logon rights such as 'Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services' are tracked separately by events 4717/4718, not this one.
What triggers it
Legitimately: SYSTEM applying a Group Policy Object's User Rights Assignment settings at startup or policy refresh, or an administrator manually editing local security policy (secpol.msc). Maliciously: an attacker with sufficient privileges granting a sensitive right such as SeDebugPrivilege, SeImpersonatePrivilege, or SeServiceLogonRight to a compromised or attacker-controlled account to enable credential dumping, token impersonation, or a service-based persistence mechanism.
Fields that carry the answer
| Field | What it tells you |
|---|---|
| Account Name (Subject) | Who made the policy change. Microsoft's own guidance is to flag every occurrence where this isn't SYSTEM. |
| Account Name (Target Account) | Which account received the right. Check it against expected admin/service accounts and whether it needs that capability. |
| User Right (New Right) | The specific privilege granted (e.g. SeDebugPrivilege, SeTcbPrivilege, SeImpersonatePrivilege, SeServiceLogonRight): the core signal for whether this is routine baselining or a dangerous grant. |
In practice
SYSTEM applies a Group Policy Object at startup, generating a 4704 for Target Account CORP\svc-sql with User Right SeServiceLogonRight. Routine service-account provisioning. The same event with Subject CORP\jdoe (not SYSTEM, not a domain admin) granting Target Account tempsvc the right SeDebugPrivilege outside a documented change window looks like privilege escalation staged for a later credential-dumping step.
Sample record
A user right was assigned. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: DC01$ Account Domain: CORP Logon ID: 0x3E7 Target Account: Account Name: CORP\svc-sql New Right: User Right: SeServiceLogonRight
ATT&CK techniques
- T1098: Account Manipulation
Sources
Paste a record into Event XML or open a log in EVTX Reader.