Security event 4738
A user account was changed
Channel: Security. Category: User Account Management.
What it records
Fires on modifications to a user object's attributes (display name, UPN, home directory, delegation settings (AllowedToDelegateTo), primary group, or User Account Control flags) with a separate event per change. Some changes (e.g. a DACL edit) still generate the event but show every Changed Attribute as '-', giving no detail on what changed.
Why it matters
The catch-all event for account-attribute tampering. Security teams specifically watch for UAC flag flips (e.g. enabling 'Trusted for Delegation' or 'Don't Require Preauth') and new AllowedToDelegateTo values, both used in real Kerberos-delegation and AS-REP-roasting privilege-escalation attacks.
What triggers it
Legitimately triggered by routine AD administration (updating a profile path, expiration date, etc.); maliciously triggered when an attacker enables Kerberos delegation, disables pre-authentication, or otherwise weakens an account to make it easier to compromise or persist through.
Fields that carry the answer
| Field | What it tells you |
|---|---|
| Target Account > Account Name | The account that was modified. Identify whether a high-value or service account was targeted. |
| AllowedToDelegateTo | New list of SPNs the account can present delegated credentials to: a newly populated or expanded list is a hallmark of a Kerberos-delegation privilege-escalation attack. |
| User Account Control | Plain-text list of the specific UAC flags that changed (e.g. 'Trusted For Delegation' or 'Don't Require Preauth' enabled): the fastest way to spot an account being deliberately weakened for later abuse. |
| Primary Group ID | Populated only when the account's primary group RID changed: a value other than 513 (Domain Users) on a user account is anomalous and worth investigating. |
In practice
Target Account > Account Name shows the service account CORP\svc-sql02, with User Account Control listing "Trusted For Delegation" as newly enabled and AllowedToDelegateTo newly populated with the SPN "CIFS/dc01.corp.local." That combination is the classic signature of an attacker configuring Kerberos delegation abuse to later impersonate other users against the domain controller.
Sample record
A user account was changed. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-3457937927-2839227994-823803824-1105 Account Name: itadmin1 Account Domain: CORP Logon ID: 0x3E4A17 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-3457937927-2839227994-823803824-2201 Account Name: svc-sql02 Account Domain: CORP Changed Attributes: SAM Account Name: svc-sql02 Display Name: - User Principal Name: svc-sql02@corp.example.com Home Directory: - Home Drive: - Script Path: - Profile Path: - User Workstations: - Password Last Set: - Account Expires: - Primary Group ID: - AllowedToDelegateTo: CIFS/dc01.corp.local Old UAC Value: 0x80000 New UAC Value: 0x80200 User Account Control: Trusted For Delegation - Enabled User Parameters: - SID History: - Logon Hours: - Additional Information: Privileges: -
ATT&CK techniques
- T1098: Account Manipulation
Sources
Paste a record into Event XML or open a log in EVTX Reader.