CyberKit

Event IDs

Security event 4738

A user account was changed

Channel: Security. Category: User Account Management.

What it records

Fires on modifications to a user object's attributes (display name, UPN, home directory, delegation settings (AllowedToDelegateTo), primary group, or User Account Control flags) with a separate event per change. Some changes (e.g. a DACL edit) still generate the event but show every Changed Attribute as '-', giving no detail on what changed.

Why it matters

The catch-all event for account-attribute tampering. Security teams specifically watch for UAC flag flips (e.g. enabling 'Trusted for Delegation' or 'Don't Require Preauth') and new AllowedToDelegateTo values, both used in real Kerberos-delegation and AS-REP-roasting privilege-escalation attacks.

What triggers it

Legitimately triggered by routine AD administration (updating a profile path, expiration date, etc.); maliciously triggered when an attacker enables Kerberos delegation, disables pre-authentication, or otherwise weakens an account to make it easier to compromise or persist through.

Fields that carry the answer

Key fields
FieldWhat it tells you
Target Account > Account NameThe account that was modified. Identify whether a high-value or service account was targeted.
AllowedToDelegateToNew list of SPNs the account can present delegated credentials to: a newly populated or expanded list is a hallmark of a Kerberos-delegation privilege-escalation attack.
User Account ControlPlain-text list of the specific UAC flags that changed (e.g. 'Trusted For Delegation' or 'Don't Require Preauth' enabled): the fastest way to spot an account being deliberately weakened for later abuse.
Primary Group IDPopulated only when the account's primary group RID changed: a value other than 513 (Domain Users) on a user account is anomalous and worth investigating.

In practice

Target Account > Account Name shows the service account CORP\svc-sql02, with User Account Control listing "Trusted For Delegation" as newly enabled and AllowedToDelegateTo newly populated with the SPN "CIFS/dc01.corp.local." That combination is the classic signature of an attacker configuring Kerberos delegation abuse to later impersonate other users against the domain controller.

Sample record

A user account was changed.

Subject:
	Security ID:		S-1-5-21-3457937927-2839227994-823803824-1105
	Account Name:		itadmin1
	Account Domain:		CORP
	Logon ID:		0x3E4A17

Target Account:
	Security ID:		S-1-5-21-3457937927-2839227994-823803824-2201
	Account Name:		svc-sql02
	Account Domain:		CORP

Changed Attributes:
	SAM Account Name:		svc-sql02
	Display Name:			-
	User Principal Name:		svc-sql02@corp.example.com
	Home Directory:			-
	Home Drive:			-
	Script Path:			-
	Profile Path:			-
	User Workstations:		-
	Password Last Set:		-
	Account Expires:		-
	Primary Group ID:		-
	AllowedToDelegateTo:		CIFS/dc01.corp.local
	Old UAC Value:			0x80000
	New UAC Value:			0x80200
	User Account Control:		Trusted For Delegation - Enabled
	User Parameters:		-
	SID History:			-
	Logon Hours:			-

Additional Information:
	Privileges:		-

ATT&CK techniques

  • T1098: Account Manipulation

Sources

Paste a record into Event XML or open a log in EVTX Reader.