Security event 4741
A computer account was created
Channel: Security. Category: Computer Account Management.
What it records
Generated only on a domain controller every time a new computer object is created in Active Directory. Captures who created it (Subject), the new machine account's name and SID, and a snapshot of its initial attributes: SAM account name, UAC flags, primary group, password-last-set, DNS host name, and registered SPNs.
Why it matters
Every domain-joined machine, and every rogue machine account an attacker registers, starts here. Because any authenticated user can create up to ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota (10 by default) computer accounts, 4741 is the starting point for spotting machine-account-quota abuse, which attacks like noPac/sAMAccountName-spoofing that create a throwaway computer account as a stepping stone toward impersonating a domain controller or escalating privileges.
What triggers it
Legitimately, a workstation or server joining the domain, or IT staff pre-staging a computer account before deployment. Anomalously, a low-privileged authenticated user creating a computer account outside any deployment process, especially one whose SAM Account Name, Primary Group ID, or UAC flags don't match the routine domain-join pattern.
Fields that carry the answer
| Field | What it tells you |
|---|---|
| Account Name (Subject) | Who created the new computer account. Routine domain-join is performed by the joining machine or an IT/provisioning account; creation by an ordinary user account is the anomaly to chase. |
| Account Name (New Computer Account) | The new machine account's SAM name, ending in $: the identity to track going forward (e.g. for a subsequent rename in a sAMAccountName-spoofing attack). |
| SAM Account Name | Should equal Account Name: a mismatch or an unusual naming pattern (rather than a normal hostname) is worth reviewing. |
| Primary Group ID | RID of the new account's primary group: 515 (Domain Computers) is normal; 516/521 (Domain Controllers/RODCs) on an account that isn't an actual new DC is a red flag. |
| Password Last Set | Timestamp the account's password was set. '<never>' typically indicates a manually created computer account rather than a standard domain join. |
In practice
Logged on a domain controller when a new computer account WKSTN042$ is created with Account Name (Subject) CORP\itadmin, Primary Group ID 515, and Password Last Set showing the join time: a routine workstation domain join. The same event for an account created by CORP\jsmith (an ordinary user, not IT staff) outside any known deployment window is the pattern flagged in machine-account-quota abuse, where the throwaway account is later renamed and used to impersonate a domain controller.
Sample record
A computer account was created. Subject: Security ID: CORP\itadmin Account Name: itadmin Account Domain: CORP Logon ID: 0xC88B2 New Computer Account: Security ID: CORP\WKSTN042$ Account Name: WKSTN042$ Account Domain: CORP Attributes: SAM Account Name: WKSTN042$ Display Name: - Password Last Set: 7/9/2026 9:14:02 AM Primary Group ID: 515 Old UAC Value: 0x0 New UAC Value: 0x80 DNS Host Name: WKSTN042.corp.local Service Principal Names: HOST/WKSTN042.corp.local HOST/WKSTN042 Additional Information: Privileges: -
Sources
Paste a record into Event XML or open a log in EVTX Reader.