Security event 4765
SID History was added to an account
Channel: Security. Category: User Account Management.
What it records
Generated on a domain controller whenever a value is added to an account's sIDHistory attribute. Records the Subject who performed the operation, the Target Account the SID History was added to, the Source Account the historical SID came from, and the specific SID(s) added in the SID List.
Why it matters
This is the direct detection point for SID-History injection (MITRE ATT&CK T1134.005). sIDHistory is normally only populated by a controlled inter-domain/inter-forest migration tool such as ADMT, so any 4765 outside a known, scheduled migration window is worth immediate scrutiny: an attacker with sufficient privilege (or via a DCShadow rogue-DC operation) can inject the SID of a highly-privileged group such as Enterprise Admins into a low-privilege account's SID History, granting it that group's effective access without ever adding it as a visible group member.
What triggers it
Legitimately: an Active Directory Migration Tool (ADMT) or equivalent cross-domain/cross-forest migration job adding a migrated account's original SID to the new account's SID History so it retains access to resources in the source domain. Maliciously: an attacker with domain admin-equivalent rights directly injecting an SID from a privileged group or account into a target's SID History outside any known migration window.
Fields that carry the answer
| Field | What it tells you |
|---|---|
| Target Account > Account Name | The account SID History was added to: the account gaining the extra, normally invisible access. |
| Source Account > Account Name | The account the historical SID was copied from. Verify it's a legitimate migration source, not a privileged account or group in another domain/forest. |
| Additional Information > SID List | The actual SID(s) added. Resolve each one to check whether it belongs to a highly-privileged group (e.g. Enterprise Admins) the target account shouldn't inherit access from. |
| Subject > Account Name | Who or what performed the addition. Outside the ADMT service account or a documented migration window, this is a strong red flag. |
In practice
A cross-forest ADMT migration adds the source-domain SID for a newly migrated account to the target account's SID History; Target Account > Account Name shows CORP\jdoe, Source Account > Account Name shows LEGACY\jdoe, and Additional Information > SID List shows the single migrated SID. Routine during a scheduled migration window, but the same event adding an Enterprise Admins group SID to an otherwise low-privilege account, performed by a subject other than the ADMT service account, is a strong SID-History-injection indicator.
Sample record
SID History was added to an account. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-3623811015-3361044348-30300820-500 Account Name: administrator Account Domain: CORP Logon ID: 0x3E7F2A1 Target Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-3623811015-3361044348-30300820-1108 Account Name: jdoe Account Domain: CORP Source Account: Security ID: S-1-5-21-1177238915-682003330-1004336348-1108 Account Name: jdoe Additional Information: Privileges: - SID List: S-1-5-21-1177238915-682003330-1004336348-1108
ATT&CK techniques
- T1134.005: T1134.005
Sources
Paste a record into Event XML or open a log in EVTX Reader.