CyberKit

Event IDs

Security event 4765

SID History was added to an account

Channel: Security. Category: User Account Management.

What it records

Generated on a domain controller whenever a value is added to an account's sIDHistory attribute. Records the Subject who performed the operation, the Target Account the SID History was added to, the Source Account the historical SID came from, and the specific SID(s) added in the SID List.

Why it matters

This is the direct detection point for SID-History injection (MITRE ATT&CK T1134.005). sIDHistory is normally only populated by a controlled inter-domain/inter-forest migration tool such as ADMT, so any 4765 outside a known, scheduled migration window is worth immediate scrutiny: an attacker with sufficient privilege (or via a DCShadow rogue-DC operation) can inject the SID of a highly-privileged group such as Enterprise Admins into a low-privilege account's SID History, granting it that group's effective access without ever adding it as a visible group member.

What triggers it

Legitimately: an Active Directory Migration Tool (ADMT) or equivalent cross-domain/cross-forest migration job adding a migrated account's original SID to the new account's SID History so it retains access to resources in the source domain. Maliciously: an attacker with domain admin-equivalent rights directly injecting an SID from a privileged group or account into a target's SID History outside any known migration window.

Fields that carry the answer

Key fields
FieldWhat it tells you
Target Account > Account NameThe account SID History was added to: the account gaining the extra, normally invisible access.
Source Account > Account NameThe account the historical SID was copied from. Verify it's a legitimate migration source, not a privileged account or group in another domain/forest.
Additional Information > SID ListThe actual SID(s) added. Resolve each one to check whether it belongs to a highly-privileged group (e.g. Enterprise Admins) the target account shouldn't inherit access from.
Subject > Account NameWho or what performed the addition. Outside the ADMT service account or a documented migration window, this is a strong red flag.

In practice

A cross-forest ADMT migration adds the source-domain SID for a newly migrated account to the target account's SID History; Target Account > Account Name shows CORP\jdoe, Source Account > Account Name shows LEGACY\jdoe, and Additional Information > SID List shows the single migrated SID. Routine during a scheduled migration window, but the same event adding an Enterprise Admins group SID to an otherwise low-privilege account, performed by a subject other than the ADMT service account, is a strong SID-History-injection indicator.

Sample record

SID History was added to an account.

Subject:
	Security ID:		S-1-5-21-3623811015-3361044348-30300820-500
	Account Name:		administrator
	Account Domain:		CORP
	Logon ID:		0x3E7F2A1

Target Account:
	Security ID:		S-1-5-21-3623811015-3361044348-30300820-1108
	Account Name:		jdoe
	Account Domain:		CORP

Source Account:
	Security ID:		S-1-5-21-1177238915-682003330-1004336348-1108
	Account Name:		jdoe

Additional Information:
	Privileges:		-
	SID List:		S-1-5-21-1177238915-682003330-1004336348-1108

ATT&CK techniques

Sources

Paste a record into Event XML or open a log in EVTX Reader.