CyberKit

Event IDs

Security event 4794

An attempt was made to set the Directory Services Restore Mode administrator password

Channel: Security. Category: User Account Management.

What it records

Generated only on domain controllers, every time the Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) administrator password is changed. Captured as a Success or Failure event depending on the outcome. It records the Subject who made the change, their Logon ID, and the Caller Workstation the request came from.

Why it matters

The DSRM administrator is a local SAM-based account stored outside Active Directory, so it isn't subject to domain password policy, Group Policy, or normal AD credential resets: a well-known persistence backdoor on domain controllers, since an attacker who sets a known DSRM password retains an AD-independent, effectively local-admin credential on every DC where they do it. Microsoft's own guidance is to always monitor and alert on every occurrence of this event.

What triggers it

Legitimately: a rare, deliberate administrative action, setting or resetting the DSRM password with ntdsutil, typically during DC build-out or ahead of a planned AD restore. Because it's so infrequent in normal operations, essentially any 4794 outside a known, documented change window warrants investigation.

Fields that carry the answer

Key fields
FieldWhat it tells you
Account Name (Subject)Who requested the DSRM password change: a change by an unexpected account, or on a DC with no planned maintenance, is the primary red flag.
Logon IDCorrelates the change back to the specific logon session (via the matching 4624) that performed it.
Caller WorkstationThe computer the request originated from, which matches the DC's own name if the change was made locally at the console, differs if pushed from elsewhere.

In practice

On DC01, Account Name CORP\dadmin sets the DSRM administrator password via ntdsutil, with Caller Workstation DC01 and Status 0x0 (success). The same event appearing on a domain controller with no scheduled AD restore or rebuild in progress, especially one triggered remotely rather than from the DC's own console, is the classic signature of an attacker planting a DSRM-based backdoor credential.

Sample record

Log Name:	Security
Source:	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
Event ID:	4794
Task Category:	User Account Management
Level:	Information
Keywords:	Audit Success
User:	N/A
Computer:	DC01.corp.example.local
Description:
An attempt was made to set the Directory Services Restore Mode administrator password.

Subject:
	Security ID:		CORP\dadmin
	Account Name:		dadmin
	Account Domain:		CORP
	Logon ID:		0x36F67

Additional Information:
	Caller Workstation:	DC01
	Status Code:		0x0

ATT&CK techniques

  • T1098: Account Manipulation

Sources

Paste a record into Event XML or open a log in EVTX Reader.