Security event 5137
A directory service object was created
Channel: Security. Category: DS Access (Audit Directory Service Changes).
What it records
Generated every time a new Active Directory object is created, provided the parent container's SACL has a 'Create' auditing entry for that object class. Records the new object's DN, GUID, and class (user, computer, group, groupPolicyContainer, etc.), along with the Subject who created it.
Why it matters
Completes the AD object lifecycle audit trail alongside 5136 (modified) and 5141 (deleted). It's the earliest point at which a newly provisioned object (a backdoor user account, an unexpected new GPO, a rogue computer object) appears in the log, before any of its other attributes have been individually set. Microsoft specifically recommends monitoring for new groupPolicyContainer creations.
What triggers it
Legitimately: routine account, computer, group, or OU provisioning by IT/HR onboarding workflows. Maliciously: an attacker creating a new user or computer account for persistence, or a new GPO intended to push a malicious logon script or scheduled task domain-wide.
Fields that carry the answer
| Field | What it tells you |
|---|---|
| Object Class | The type of object created. User, computer, group, and especially groupPolicyContainer are the highest-value classes to watch for creation outside a change window. |
| Object DN | Where in the AD tree the object was created: a new object landing outside the expected OU structure (e.g. directly in a default Users container rather than a provisioning OU) is worth a second look. |
| Account Name (Subject) | Who created the object. Creation by an account outside the normal provisioning workflow or service account is the primary anomaly signal. |
| Correlation ID | Links this creation to any accompanying 5136 attribute-set events from the same underlying LDAP operation. |
In practice
A new object with Object Class groupPolicyContainer and Object DN CN={6F9619FF-8B86-D011-B42D-00C04FC964FF},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=local is created by CORP\jsmith, an account with no Group Policy management role. An unexpected new GPO creation like this, especially followed by it being linked to a high-value OU, is a well-known technique for pushing malicious startup scripts or scheduled tasks domain-wide.
Sample record
Log Name: Security
Source: Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
Event ID: 5137
Task Category: Directory Service Changes
Level: Information
Keywords: Audit Success
User: N/A
Computer: DC01.corp.example.local
Description:
A directory service object was created.
Subject:
Security ID: CORP\jsmith
Account Name: jsmith
Account Domain: CORP
Logon ID: 0x32004
Directory Service:
Name: corp.example.local
Type: Active Directory Domain Services
Object:
DN: CN={6F9619FF-8B86-D011-B42D-00C04FC964FF},CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=local
GUID: {41D5F7AF-64A2-4985-9A4B-70DAAFC7CCE6}
Class: groupPolicyContainer
Operation:
Correlation ID: {4EAD68FF-7229-42A4-8C73-AAB57169858B}
Application Correlation ID: -ATT&CK techniques
- T1136.002: T1136.002
Sources
Paste a record into Event XML or open a log in EVTX Reader.