CyberKit

Event IDs

Sysmon event 1

Process creation

Channel: Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational. Category: Process Creation.

What it records

Logs the creation of a new process, capturing the full command line (for both the new process and its parent), a ProcessGuid for reliable correlation across events, and a hash of the executable image (SHA1 by default, or MD5/SHA256/IMPHASH).

Why it matters

Endpoint process trees are reconstructed from it: the full command line and parent/child linkage let an analyst trace exactly how a process was launched and by what, and the hash supports fast reputation/IOC matching.

What triggers it

Every process launch on the system triggers it, from normal user and application activity to malware execution, living-off-the-land binary abuse, and scripting-interpreter children.

Fields that carry the answer

Key fields
FieldWhat it tells you
ImageFull path of the executable that ran. Pivot here to spot processes launching from suspicious locations like temp, AppData, or public folders instead of Program Files.
CommandLineShows exactly how the process was invoked, including arguments: the richest field for spotting encoded PowerShell, LOLBin abuse, or malicious flags the process name alone won't reveal.
ParentImageIdentifies what spawned the process. Word or Excel spawning cmd.exe or powershell.exe is a classic macro-malware pattern.
ParentCommandLineGives the parent process's full invocation, useful for tracing multi-stage execution chains back to their origin (e.g., a phishing document's macro command).
UserThe account context the process ran under, which flags execution under an unexpected or service account, and helps spot privilege escalation.
HashesLets you pivot straight to threat-intel or VirusTotal lookups without needing the file itself, and catches renamed or relocated malware reusing a known-bad hash.
IntegrityLevelShows the privilege level the process ran at: a jump to a higher integrity level than the parent normally grants is a strong sign of privilege escalation.

In practice

Sysmon logs Image C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe with ParentImage C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\WINWORD.EXE, a base64-encoded CommandLine (-enc ...), and User CORP\jsmith. Word spawning an encoded PowerShell child is a well-known macro-malware execution chain.

Sample record

Process Create:
RuleName: -
UtcTime: 2024-01-15 14:32:07.123
ProcessGuid: {5a8f3c2b-7e41-65b0-1200-000000001b00}
ProcessId: 4521
Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
FileVersion: 10.0.19041.1
Description: Windows PowerShell
Product: Microsoft® Windows® Operating System
Company: Microsoft Corporation
OriginalFileName: PowerShell.EXE
CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -nop -w hidden -enc SQBFAFgAIAAoAE4AZQB3AC0ATwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIABOAGUAdAAuAFcAZQBiAEMAbABpAGUAbgB0ACkALgBEAG8AdwBuAGwAbwBhAGQAUwB0AHIAaQBuAGcA
CurrentDirectory: C:\Users\jsmith\Desktop\
User: CORP\jsmith
LogonGuid: {5a8f3c2b-7e3f-65b0-1100-0000000a4d3e}
LogonId: 0xA4D3E
TerminalSessionId: 1
IntegrityLevel: Medium
Hashes: SHA1=1B69B7E805A9A5424B76CD1FE7C3A22F9E2C6D40
ParentProcessGuid: {5a8f3c2b-7e3d-65b0-0f00-000000001a00}
ParentProcessId: 3344
ParentImage: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\WINWORD.EXE
ParentCommandLine: "C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\WINWORD.EXE" /n "C:\Users\jsmith\Desktop\invoice.docm"
ParentUser: CORP\jsmith

Sources

Paste a record into Event XML or open a log in EVTX Reader.