Sysmon event 1
Process creation
Channel: Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational. Category: Process Creation.
What it records
Logs the creation of a new process, capturing the full command line (for both the new process and its parent), a ProcessGuid for reliable correlation across events, and a hash of the executable image (SHA1 by default, or MD5/SHA256/IMPHASH).
Why it matters
Endpoint process trees are reconstructed from it: the full command line and parent/child linkage let an analyst trace exactly how a process was launched and by what, and the hash supports fast reputation/IOC matching.
What triggers it
Every process launch on the system triggers it, from normal user and application activity to malware execution, living-off-the-land binary abuse, and scripting-interpreter children.
Fields that carry the answer
| Field | What it tells you |
|---|---|
| Image | Full path of the executable that ran. Pivot here to spot processes launching from suspicious locations like temp, AppData, or public folders instead of Program Files. |
| CommandLine | Shows exactly how the process was invoked, including arguments: the richest field for spotting encoded PowerShell, LOLBin abuse, or malicious flags the process name alone won't reveal. |
| ParentImage | Identifies what spawned the process. Word or Excel spawning cmd.exe or powershell.exe is a classic macro-malware pattern. |
| ParentCommandLine | Gives the parent process's full invocation, useful for tracing multi-stage execution chains back to their origin (e.g., a phishing document's macro command). |
| User | The account context the process ran under, which flags execution under an unexpected or service account, and helps spot privilege escalation. |
| Hashes | Lets you pivot straight to threat-intel or VirusTotal lookups without needing the file itself, and catches renamed or relocated malware reusing a known-bad hash. |
| IntegrityLevel | Shows the privilege level the process ran at: a jump to a higher integrity level than the parent normally grants is a strong sign of privilege escalation. |
In practice
Sysmon logs Image C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe with ParentImage C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\WINWORD.EXE, a base64-encoded CommandLine (-enc ...), and User CORP\jsmith. Word spawning an encoded PowerShell child is a well-known macro-malware execution chain.
Sample record
Process Create:
RuleName: -
UtcTime: 2024-01-15 14:32:07.123
ProcessGuid: {5a8f3c2b-7e41-65b0-1200-000000001b00}
ProcessId: 4521
Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
FileVersion: 10.0.19041.1
Description: Windows PowerShell
Product: Microsoft® Windows® Operating System
Company: Microsoft Corporation
OriginalFileName: PowerShell.EXE
CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -nop -w hidden -enc SQBFAFgAIAAoAE4AZQB3AC0ATwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIABOAGUAdAAuAFcAZQBiAEMAbABpAGUAbgB0ACkALgBEAG8AdwBuAGwAbwBhAGQAUwB0AHIAaQBuAGcA
CurrentDirectory: C:\Users\jsmith\Desktop\
User: CORP\jsmith
LogonGuid: {5a8f3c2b-7e3f-65b0-1100-0000000a4d3e}
LogonId: 0xA4D3E
TerminalSessionId: 1
IntegrityLevel: Medium
Hashes: SHA1=1B69B7E805A9A5424B76CD1FE7C3A22F9E2C6D40
ParentProcessGuid: {5a8f3c2b-7e3d-65b0-0f00-000000001a00}
ParentProcessId: 3344
ParentImage: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\WINWORD.EXE
ParentCommandLine: "C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\WINWORD.EXE" /n "C:\Users\jsmith\Desktop\invoice.docm"
ParentUser: CORP\jsmithSources
Paste a record into Event XML or open a log in EVTX Reader.