Sysmon event 3
Network connection
Channel: Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational. Category: Network Connection.
What it records
Logs TCP/UDP network connections initiated by a process, including source/destination hostnames, IP addresses, port numbers, and IPv6 status. Disabled by default because of the volume it generates.
Why it matters
Ties outbound or inbound network activity to a specific process and ProcessGuid, which is essential for identifying C2 beaconing, lateral movement, or exfiltration channels during an investigation.
What triggers it
Any process opening a network socket triggers it: ordinary browsing and application traffic as well as malware C2 callbacks, port scanning, or lateral-movement tooling.
Fields that carry the answer
| Field | What it tells you |
|---|---|
| Image | The process that opened the connection, which ties beaconing or exfiltration traffic to a specific executable rather than just an IP/port pair. |
| DestinationIp | The remote address contacted: the core IOC to pivot on against threat-intel feeds or block lists. |
| DestinationPort | The remote port used. Unusual high ports or non-standard use of common ports (e.g., 443 without real TLS) are common C2 tells. |
| DestinationHostname | The resolved hostname of the destination, when available, often easier to recognize as malicious infrastructure than a bare IP. |
| Initiated | Shows whether this host initiated the connection outbound, which separates outbound C2 callbacks from inbound connections to a listening service. |
| User | The account context that made the connection, useful for spotting a service account or SYSTEM process reaching out to the internet unexpectedly. |
In practice
Image C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe (User CORP\jsmith) shows Initiated: true, DestinationIp 203.0.113.10, DestinationPort 443, DestinationPortName https. PowerShell making an outbound HTTPS connection directly, rather than a browser, is a common C2 beaconing pattern worth correlating with the parent process chain from Event ID 1.
Sample record
Network connection detected:
RuleName: -
UtcTime: 2024-01-15 14:36:02.789
ProcessGuid: {5a8f3c2b-7e41-65b0-1200-000000001b00}
ProcessId: 4521
Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
User: CORP\jsmith
Protocol: tcp
Initiated: true
SourceIsIpv6: false
SourceIp: 198.51.100.23
SourceHostname: WKSTN-JSMITH.corp.local
SourcePort: 51322
SourcePortName: -
DestinationIsIpv6: false
DestinationIp: 203.0.113.10
DestinationHostname: -
DestinationPort: 443
DestinationPortName: httpsSources
Paste a record into Event XML or open a log in EVTX Reader.