Cloud Persistence
Techniques that let an attacker retain cloud access across sessions.
What it is
The set of techniques an attacker uses to keep access to a cloud environment over time, such as creating new credentials, adding identity trust, or planting backdoor roles and automation. It survives the loss of the original foothold.
Why it matters
Cloud persistence often hides in legitimate identity and configuration changes, so a thorough investigation must hunt for planted access, not just evict the initial entry point.
In practice
A responder finds the attacker created a second access key on a service account and added an external trust, ensuring a way back after cleanup.
What to look for
- New IAM users, access keys or roles created after an intrusion.
- Trust policies changed to allow external accounts.
- New functions, scheduled jobs or OAuth apps no one requested.
Common mistake
Rotating the stolen key and stopping there. Attackers often create their own keys or roles before you notice.
Practice it nearby
CyberKit has no tool for this term itself. These are the closest places to practice it.
In the field
Well-known tools where this shows up on the job. They are listed to show the landscape, not as a recommendation.
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Amazon GuardDuty Cloud service
AWS threat detection that analyzes CloudTrail, VPC flow logs and DNS logs.
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Microsoft Defender for Cloud Commercial
Posture and threat protection for Azure, AWS and Google Cloud.
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Wiz Commercial
Maps cloud resources, identities and exposures into one graph of risk.
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Prowler Open source
An open source tool that checks cloud accounts against benchmarks such as CIS.
Read next
- Access Keys: Static, long-lived credential pairs used to authenticate to cloud APIs.
- Role Assumption: Temporarily taking on a role's permissions to act as a different identity.
- Cloud Audit Logging: The record of management-plane API calls made across a cloud account.