Virtual Address Descriptor Tree
Also called VAD Tree, VAD.
Per-process map of reserved and committed virtual memory regions.
What it is
A balanced binary tree the Windows kernel keeps for each process to track every range of its virtual address space, recording the protection, type, and any backing file for each region. Walking it reveals what a process has mapped without trusting the process itself.
Why it matters
The VAD tree exposes memory regions that loaded modules and injected code occupy, including private executable regions that have no file on disk and no module-list entry. It is a primary structure for spotting code injection and unpacking in a memory image.
In practice
A private, committed region marked PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE in a browser's VAD tree, with no mapped file behind it, pointing straight at injected shellcode.
What to look for
- Private regions marked executable and read write.
- Regions with no backing file inside trusted processes.
- Large committed regions that appeared after injection.
Common mistake
Trusting the protection flags alone. Malware can change them after writing, so compare with the backing file.
Practice it nearby
CyberKit has no tool for this term itself. These are the closest places to practice it.
- Collection Plan
Build a host collection command list, ordered by volatility.
- Windows Host Case
An alert on a live Windows workstation: read the event logs and the Registry, rebuild the timeline, then decide what to collect.
In the field
Well-known tools where this shows up on the job. They are listed to show the landscape, not as a recommendation.
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Volatility 3 Open source
A widely used open source framework for analyzing memory images with plugins. Our notes.
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Velociraptor Open source
Can collect memory and query live process memory across many hosts. Our notes.
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CrowdStrike Falcon Commercial
EDR agents watch memory activity on the host, such as injection and unbacked code.
Read next
- EPROCESS: The kernel structure describing a running Windows process.
- Code Injection: Placing and running attacker code inside another process's memory.
- Injected Code Detection: Finding hidden code by pairing region protections with backing files.