CyberKit

IR playbooks

Insider Data Theft

Someone with legitimate access took something. The evidence is ordinary activity in an unusual pattern.

Insider cases invert the usual problem. There is no intrusion to find, no malware, and no unauthorised access in the technical sense. Every action is one the person was entitled to take, so the case is built from pattern, timing and volume rather than from a compromise. They are also the cases most likely to end up in front of lawyers, which raises the bar on process and on how carefully you phrase what you found.

The first hour

  1. Confirm the request is authorized, and who is authorizing it. Insider investigations touch employment and privacy law, and starting one informally is a mistake that is hard to undo.
  2. Preserve before anything else, and quietly. If the person is still employed and unaware, an obvious investigation changes their behavior and can destroy the evidence.
  3. Establish the relevant window: notice period, role change, a project ending, a competitor hire.
  4. Preserve the endpoint without alerting the user, and preserve the account's cloud and mail activity in parallel.

Decisions you will be asked to make

Covert or overt?

Options
OptionWhat it costs
CovertPreserves natural behavior and evidence. Higher legal and HR risk, and needs explicit authorization.
OvertStops ongoing exfiltration immediately. Ends any chance of observing what they do next.

This is not a technical decision and should not be made by the technical team. Get it in writing from whoever owns it, and record when you were told.

How much history do you actually have?

Options
OptionWhat it costs
Endpoint DLP and USB logging in placeStrong evidence. Rare.
Cloud and mail logs onlyGood for uploads and sends; blind to USB and printing.
Host artifacts onlyShellBags, LNKs and Registry USB history establish access and device connection, not the copy itself.

Establish what you can prove before framing what you will look for. Insider cases are where absence of evidence is most often mistaken for evidence of absence, in both directions.

Scoping questions

  • What was accessed that this person had no business reason to access, and when relative to their departure?
  • Which removable devices were connected, and can any be tied to a specific physical device by serial?
  • What was uploaded to personal cloud storage, webmail or a file-sharing service?
  • What was printed, and what was sent to a personal address?
  • Does the volume or timing differ from their own historical baseline, rather than from a global one?

Collect, beyond the standard triage set

  • Registry USB history: USBSTOR for the device and serial, MountedDevices for the drive letter it held.
  • ShellBags and RecentDocs, which show folders and files opened, including on removable media that is no longer present.
  • Cloud storage and mail activity for the window, including anonymous-link creation and external sharing.
  • Proxy or CASB records for uploads to personal services.
  • The person's own historical baseline, so "unusual" can be evidenced rather than asserted.

Known mistakes

  • Starting before the request is authorized in writing.
  • Reading a USB serial ending in "&0" as identifying a specific device. Windows generated that one because the device supplied none, so it is not unique.
  • Presenting access as theft. ShellBags prove a folder was viewed, not that anything was copied, and the difference matters enormously in an employment dispute.
  • Comparing against a global baseline. The question is whether this differs from what this person normally does.

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