Port 2049/tcp/udp: NFS (Network File System)
Category: File Sharing & Remote Access. Range: registered. Status: iana registered.
What runs here
Unix/Linux's native network file-sharing protocol, originally from Sun Microsystems. Older versions (NFSv2/RFC 1094, NFSv3/RFC 1813) could run over either TCP or UDP and relied on the separate rpcbind/portmapper service (port 111) to locate the actual mount/NFS daemon ports; NFSv4 (RFC 7530, and RFC 8881 for minor version 1) consolidated everything onto the single well-known port 2049 and effectively requires TCP.
Why it matters
Classic NFS authorization is host- and UID-based rather than credential-based: a client presenting a given UID over a trusted source IP is generally believed by default unless the export is configured with root-squashing and, ideally, Kerberos (sec=krb5). That means an attacker who can reach an export from a trusted-looking address, or who can assume or spoof a privileged UID, can read or write files with no password at all: a long-standing Unix privilege-escalation and data-exposure vector when exports are misconfigured.
Where you see it
Legitimately: enterprise/HPC shared storage, ESXi or Unix backup and build targets. Anomalously/maliciously: mounting a misconfigured export from an untrusted host, exploiting a no_root_squash export to write a setuid binary or an SSH authorized_keys file onto the target, or a client spoofing a trusted UID to read sensitive files.
What to look for
| Signal | What it means |
|---|---|
| showmount -e enumeration | Requests enumerating a server's exported shares are a common reconnaissance precursor to exploiting a misconfigured export. |
| no_root_squash exports | An export configured with no_root_squash (root on the client maps to root on the server) is a critical finding during any NFS configuration review. |
Related ports
- 111/tcp/udp: RPCbind (Portmapper) / ONC RPC