Port 88/tcp/udp: Kerberos
Category: Name Resolution & Directory Services. Range: well-known. Status: iana registered.
What runs here
Kerberos is the network authentication protocol Active Directory and other Kerberos realms use to issue and validate tickets proving a principal's identity without repeatedly transmitting a password: a client obtains a Ticket-Granting Ticket (TGT) from the Key Distribution Center's Authentication Service, then uses it to request per-service Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) tickets. Port 88 is IANA-registered and defined by RFC 4120 (The Kerberos Network Authentication Service V5), and it genuinely runs over both UDP and TCP: RFC 4120 requires implementations to support both, with UDP preferred for small messages but TCP required whenever a message exceeds the practical UDP datagram size, which is routine in Active Directory once the Privilege Attribute Certificate is included.
Why it matters
Port 88 is the single most consequential authentication port in a modern Windows environment, and well-documented attack techniques revolve entirely around it: Kerberoasting requests TGS tickets for accounts with a Service Principal Name and cracks the returned ticket offline for the account's password, and AS-REP Roasting targets accounts with Kerberos pre-authentication disabled to obtain a crackable AS-REP without any prior credentials at all. Both are visible as distinctive request patterns on 88 well before any offline cracking succeeds.
Where you see it
Legitimately: normal domain logon and service-ticket requests (AS-REQ/AS-REP, TGS-REQ/TGS-REP) throughout a Windows domain's operation. Anomalously/maliciously: a single account requesting TGS tickets for an unusually large number of distinct SPNs in a short window (Kerberoasting), AS-REQ traffic targeting accounts with pre-authentication disabled (AS-REP Roasting), or forged or replayed tickets presenting inconsistent or implausible lifetimes and encryption types.
What to look for
| Signal | What it means |
|---|---|
| TGS-REQ volume per account/SPN | A single requesting account pulling TGS tickets for many distinct SPNs in a short window is the primary Kerberoasting signal, commonly logged as Windows Event ID 4769. |
| Ticket encryption type (etype) | RC4 tickets requested where AES is otherwise the domain norm are frequently a downgrade specifically enabling offline cracking, both for Kerberoasting and for Golden/Silver Ticket forgery. |
In practice
An attacker who has compromised a single low-privileged domain account can request TGS tickets for every account with a registered SPN and attempt to crack the returned ticket data offline, potentially recovering a service account's plaintext password without ever triggering a lockout or a logon failure event.
Related ports
- 464/tcp/udp: Kerberos Change/Set Password (kpasswd)
- 389/tcp/udp: LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol)
- 53/tcp/udp: DNS (Domain Name System)