Port 6514/tcp: Syslog over TLS
Category: Remote Management & Administration. Range: registered. Status: iana registered.
What runs here
RFC 5425's TLS transport mapping for syslog: it wraps the same RFC 5424-structured messages in a TLS session, adding the confidentiality, integrity, and (with mutual TLS) sender authentication that plain UDP/514 lacks. IANA separately registers port 6514 for a DTLS-wrapped variant (RFC 6012) as well, though the TCP/TLS mapping is the one actually seen in real-world deployments.
Why it matters
When an environment has deliberately moved log forwarding onto this port, it signals a hardened logging pipeline resistant to the spoofing and eavesdropping weaknesses of plain UDP syslog, which raises an analyst's confidence in the integrity of that log stream. Conversely, a TLS handshake failure or certificate mismatch on this port is itself worth investigating, since it can indicate a misconfigured client or a rogue collector attempting to intercept redirected log traffic.
Where you see it
Legitimately: compliance-driven or security-conscious environments (e.g. PCI-DSS-scoped networks) running rsyslog/syslog-ng with TLS-enabled forwarding. Anomalously/maliciously: an attacker standing up a rogue TLS syslog listener to intercept redirected log forwarding, or exploiting a client configured to skip certificate validation.
What to look for
| Signal | What it means |
|---|---|
| Certificate validation failures | Self-signed or otherwise unexpected certificates presented by a syslog-tls listener are worth investigating as either misconfiguration or a rogue collector. |
Related ports
- 514/udp: Syslog