Port 123/udp: NTP (Network Time Protocol)
Category: Network Infrastructure. Range: well-known. Status: iana registered.
What runs here
The port NTP servers and clients use to exchange time-synchronization messages, keeping system clocks aligned across a network. NTP is fundamentally UDP-based per its governing RFC; IANA also carries a rarely-used TCP registration for the same service name, but essentially all real-world NTP traffic is UDP.
Why it matters
Beyond keeping clocks accurate (itself forensically important: skewed clocks break log/timeline correlation across a case), older NTP daemons exposed a 'monlist' command that returned the last several hundred peers a server had talked to in a single small request, giving attackers a massive traffic-amplification factor for reflected DDoS attacks against a spoofed victim IP. An internet-facing NTP server should be checked for this legacy behavior during any infrastructure review.
Where you see it
Legitimately: routine time-sync polling between clients and configured NTP servers/pools. Anomalously/maliciously: a burst of small inbound UDP/123 requests followed by large outbound responses to a third-party IP (classic reflection/amplification abuse of an exposed server), or monlist-style queries probing for the vulnerable behavior.
What to look for
| Signal | What it means |
|---|---|
| monlist query/response | An NTP server responding to REQ_MON_GETLIST/'monlist' style control-mode queries confirms it's running an outdated build vulnerable to CVE-2013-5211 amplification abuse and should be patched or have that mode disabled. |
| Disproportionate response-to-request size | Outbound UDP/123 traffic dramatically larger than the corresponding inbound requests, directed at a single external target, is the signature of a server being used as a reflector in an active DDoS attack. |
ATT&CK techniques
- T1498.002: T1498.002