Port 137/udp: NetBIOS Name Service
Category: Name Resolution & Directory Services. Range: well-known. Status: iana registered.
What runs here
NetBIOS Name Service handles registration and resolution of NetBIOS names, the legacy host naming scheme that predates DNS on Windows networks, over UDP broadcast or to a WINS server. It is defined by RFC 1001 (concepts) and RFC 1002 (detailed wire specification) as part of the NetBIOS-over-TCP/IP suite, and while IANA registers the service name on both TCP and UDP, the Name Service function itself operates over UDP in practice, per its RFC 1002 design.
Why it matters
NBT-NS is one of two protocols, alongside LLMNR, targeted by an extremely common credential-theft technique: broadcast name-resolution poisoning. Because NBT-NS has no authentication and any host on the local broadcast segment can answer a name query, a tool like Responder can impersonate the requested host, prompt the querying client to authenticate to it, and capture the resulting NTLMv2 hash for offline cracking or relay. This technique requires no prior foothold beyond network access, and is frequently one of the first things attempted after landing on an internal network.
Where you see it
Legitimately: legacy NetBIOS name registration and resolution on networks still relying on it, largely superseded by DNS today but often still enabled by default on Windows. Anomalously/maliciously: NBT-NS and LLMNR poisoning via tools like Responder or Inveigh, visible as a host answering an unusual volume of name queries it has no legitimate authority over, followed by inbound SMB or HTTP authentication attempts to that host.
What to look for
| Signal | What it means |
|---|---|
| Unsolicited or incorrect name-query responses | A host answering NBT-NS queries for names it does not own, especially answering every failed DNS lookup, is the core Responder-style poisoning signature. |
| Resulting NTLMv2 authentication to the poisoning host | The actual credential theft happens in the follow-on SMB or HTTP authentication attempt to the spoofing host, which is the higher-value event to alert on. |
In practice
A tool like Responder answers every failed DNS lookup on a segment as if it were the requested host, prompting the victim's client to authenticate directly to the attacker over SMB or HTTP and hand over a crackable NTLMv2 hash, all without the attacker needing any prior credentials.
Related ports
- 138/udp: NetBIOS Datagram Service
- 139/tcp: NetBIOS Session Service
- 53/tcp/udp: DNS (Domain Name System)
ATT&CK techniques
- T1557.001: T1557.001