CyberKit

Tool Files & Artifacts

File Triage

Drop any file. It names the format from its first bytes, hashes it, and opens the parser that reads it: PE, ELF, Mach-O, Office, PDF, plist, or entropy and strings.

Start here when someone hands you a file and asks what it is. Drop it in, and the page reads its first bytes, names the format, hashes it, and opens the parser that understands it. The file never leaves this page.

This runs in your browser. Nothing you type or open is uploaded.

How to read it

Read the card first. It says what the file looks like and why the page decided that, so a renamed file cannot fool you. An invoice.pdf that starts with MZ is a Windows executable.

Copy the SHA-256 before anything else. It is the value you search on, share with colleagues, and put in the report.

Then read the format tab. Imports, sections, macros, PDF actions and so forth are where intent shows up. Entropy above about 7.2 bits per byte across most of a file usually means it is packed, compressed or encrypted.

Tab by tab

Windows PE

Static first look at a Windows executable before anyone detonates it. You get the headers, the section table, every import, the exports and the imphash, parsed by hand in the page.

The COFF timestamp is set by the linker and is trivially forged. Treat it as a claim.

Watch the section flags. A section that is both writable and executable, or a raw size of zero with a large virtual size, points at a packer.

The import table is the fastest route to a hypothesis. VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread together read like injection. Copy the imphash to pivot to related samples.

ELF and Mach-O

Read how a Linux or macOS binary was built without running it. The file never leaves the page. You see the header, the sections, the libraries it links and the toolchain quirks that set an intruder's build apart from the distribution's.

Drop an ELF or Mach-O file, or load the sample. Both formats state their own word size and byte order up front, and the parser reads those instead of guessing.

Findings are statements about the toolchain, not verdicts. A stripped, statically linked binary with no build ID in /tmp is worth your time. The same flags on a vendor binary in /usr/bin usually are not.

Linked libraries name capability, not behavior. libcurl means it can talk to the network. It does not say it does, or to where.

Office (OLE)

Walk a legacy Office document, an Outlook .msg or an MSI as the little filesystem it is. You see every storage and stream with its path and size, and which of them mean macros or embedded objects.

A VBA storage or a Macros stream means a macro project is present. This tool does not decompress VBA, so it tells you where the code lives, not what it does.

ObjectPool and Ole10Native streams carry embedded files. Those are where droppers hide.

A .docx or .xlsm is a ZIP, not a compound file. If this refuses your file, that is usually why.

PDF

Find the parts of a PDF that do things, not the parts that draw pages. Nothing is decompressed or run, so opening a suspect document here is safe in a way that opening it in a reader is not.

/JavaScript means script exists. /OpenAction or /AA pointing at it means it runs without a click. Those are different findings, and only the second is urgent.

More than one %%EOF means the file was saved incrementally. Later revisions can replace earlier objects, so read the last one.

Objects inside an object stream are counted, not read. The coverage note says how many the scan could not see.

Property list

Read a macOS property list in either encoding. LaunchAgents and LaunchDaemons are the main macOS persistence mechanism, and they switch between XML and binary freely.

Read ProgramArguments first. That is what actually runs.

RunAtLoad, KeepAlive and StartInterval decide when it runs. A binary under /Users/Shared, /tmp or a hidden folder with any of them set deserves your attention.

The Label is chosen by whoever wrote the file and often imitates com.apple. Dates are counted from 2001-01-01, and this tool shows them in UTC.

Entropy and strings

Two quick reads on any blob. Entropy tells you whether anything in it is readable, and strings tells you what it says. On a packed sample the first says no and the second comes back nearly empty, and that agreement is the finding.

Entropy runs from 0 to 8 bits per byte. Plain text sits around 4 to 5, code around 5 to 6.5, and compressed or encrypted data above 7.5.

High entropy is not a verdict. A ZIP, a JPEG and a signed installer sit in the same band as a packed dropper. Use the window table to find where in the file it climbs.

Strings come in ASCII and UTF-16LE. Windows binaries keep most of their paths and registry keys in UTF-16, so leave both on.

Terms behind it

  • Portable Executable Format: The Windows file format for executables, DLLs, and drivers.
  • Entropy: A randomness score that flags packed or encrypted data.
  • Packing: Compressing or encrypting a binary to hide its real code.
  • Cryptographic Hash Function: A one-way function mapping any input to a fixed-size fingerprint.
  • File Signatures: Header/footer byte patterns that identify a file's true type regardless of name.
  • Static Analysis: Examining a sample's code and structure without executing it.

Sources

  • PE Format: Microsoft Learn. Microsoft's own official specification for the Portable Executable/COFF file format (the DOS header, NT headers, section table, and import structures this page's own parsing implements) worth consulting directly for a field this tool's summarized output doesn't fully expand.
  • System V ABI: ELF specification. The structure definitions every field in the ELF half of this tool is read from, including the section and program header layouts and the dynamic-section tags.
  • Apple loader.h (Mach-O structures). Apple's own header defining every Mach-O load command and flag, including MH_PIE and the LC_ values this tool decodes.
  • MS-CFB: Compound File Binary File Format. Microsoft's own specification for the container this tool walks: the header, the FAT, the DIFAT and the 128-byte directory entries, field by field.
  • ISO 32000-1 / PDF 1.7 specification (Adobe copy). The format specification these object dictionaries and action keys are defined in. Section 12.6 is Actions, which is where OpenAction, Additional Actions and Launch live.
  • A Practical Guide to File Entropy (Mandiant). Background on using structural measurements of a binary (entropy and import hashing among them) to group and triage samples rather than to judge one in isolation.
  • GNU binutils: strings(1). The reference implementation this page's string extraction follows, including the -el flag for UTF-16LE and the same trailing-character ambiguity.

Worth using too

  • PEStudio. A free/freemium Windows-only static PE inspector built specifically for malware initial assessment. It goes deeper than a headers/imports/imphash view by also flagging suspicious strings, checking imports against a blocklist of suspicious API calls, and auto-querying VirusTotal for the file's hash reputation.
  • VirusTotal. Free hash/file lookup against 70+ antivirus engines and sandboxes, after computing a file's imphash or other hashes locally with PE Header Explorer, paste the hash into VirusTotal to check reputation and see if the same import-hash cluster has been seen in known malware families.
  • Detect It Easy (DIE). A free, open-source (MIT) file-type and packer/compiler/cryptor identification tool for PE, ELF, and Mach-O binaries: a natural next step after PE Header Explorer's static header parse, since a packed or encrypted section table often explains why imports/exports look sparse or obfuscated.
  • CFF Explorer (NTCore Explorer Suite). A free Windows PE editor/viewer with full PE32/64 and .NET support. Where PE Header Explorer is read-only, CFF Explorer lets an analyst interactively edit headers, rebuild the import table, and disassemble sections for deeper manual reverse engineering.
  • radare2. Where to go once the header tells you the binary is worth reading properly: full disassembly, symbol resolution and cross-references for both formats.
  • oletools. olevba and oleid do what this tool deliberately does not: decompress and print the VBA source, and extract embedded objects. The next step whenever a macro project turns up.
  • peepdf. A full PDF analysis tool that DOES decompress streams and extract JavaScript: the next step when this scanner tells you a script is present but cannot show it.
  • Didier Stevens' PDF tools. pdfid and pdf-parser, the tools this scanner's approach is modelled on, plus years of write-ups on what each key actually does in practice.
  • binwalk. The tool to reach for when an entropy spike turns out to be an embedded file. It carves and identifies what this page can only point at.

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