CyberKit

Tool Detect & Hunt

Rule Tester

Write a Sigma or YARA rule and test it against samples, or read a Suricata rule back in plain English.

Write a detection rule and prove it fires on the right things before it reaches production. Sigma and YARA rules run against samples here, and Suricata rules read back in plain English.

This runs in your browser. Nothing you type or open is uploaded.

How to read it

A rule is only as good as the samples that should not match. Add the benign look-alikes, then tighten until they stay quiet.

The YARA tab does real byte-level matching, and the Sigma tab evaluates every modifier it supports. Anything unsupported is named rather than silently ignored.

The Suricata tab explains the header and each option next to the content it modifies, which is where most rule mistakes hide.

Tab by tab

Sigma

Build a Sigma rule and test it against sample events in the page. Sigma describes detection logic once, and converters turn it into each SIEM's own query language.

Write each selection as one field per line, Field|modifier: value. Fields in one selection are ANDed.

The condition combines selections by name: and, or, 1 of selection*, all of them.

Paste one event per line on the Test tab, as JSON or key=value. Each row says whether the rule matched and which selections did.

Field modifiers
ModifierSyntaxWhat it does
equals(bare field name)Exact match, case-insensitive.
contains|containsSubstring match, case-insensitive.
startswith|startswithPrefix match, case-insensitive.
endswith|endswithSuffix match, case-insensitive.
re|reJavaScript regular expression match against the field value.
YARA

Build a YARA rule and scan text, hex or a file with it, byte by byte, in the page. Every offset shown is where the bytes were actually found.

Text strings take ascii, wide and nocase. Windows binaries keep many strings in UTF-16, so add wide when you hunt them.

Hex strings take ?? for any byte. Use it for version digits and other bytes that change between builds.

The condition says how many strings must hit: any of them, all of them, 2 of them, or a list.

Not supported here
FeatureExampleNote
Modulesimport "pe"The pe, math, hash, elf, magic and cuckoo modules, and every condition term they provide.
External variablesfilename matches /\.exe$/Values a caller injects at scan time. This tool has no scan-time context to inject.
Regex strings$re = /ab+c/Only text strings and hex strings are supported.
Count / offset / length#a > 3, @a, !a, $a at 0A string is a plain boolean here. No occurrence count, match offset or length arithmetic in the condition.
Rule metadatameta: author = "…"Nothing beyond the rule name: no meta block, no rule tags, no global/private modifiers.
Other string modifiers"a" fullword xor base64fullword, xor, base64, base64wide and private are all out of scope.
Hex jumps & alternatives{ 8D [2-3] 6A ( 04 | 05 ) }Nibble wildcards (?? / A? / ?A) are the only hex construct supported; jumps, alternatives and the ~ not-operator are not.
Other condition formsnone of them, 2 of ($a*)Only "them" is understood in the of-operator. none of them (YARA 4.3.0+), explicit string sets, for-loops, not, filesize and entrypoint are out of scope.
Suricata

This explains a rule; it does not run one. It serves the moment after an alert fires, when you have to work out whether the rule means what its msg claims.

Every rule starts with seven header fields in a fixed order, then a semicolon-separated option list where order carries meaning.

A modifier such as nocase or http_uri applies to the content match right before it, not to the whole rule. Misreading that is how people conclude a rule does something it does not.

A rule with only a PCRE and no content match has nothing for the fast pattern matcher, so it runs against every packet. The tool warns about it.

Terms behind it

  • Sigma Rule: A vendor-agnostic rule format for writing log-based detection logic.
  • YARA: A pattern-matching rule language to classify malware.
  • Detection Rule: Logic that defines the conditions under which an alert fires.
  • False Positive: An alert that flags benign activity as malicious.
  • Intrusion Detection System: A sensor that watches traffic and alerts on malicious activity.
  • Tuning: Adjusting detection logic to cut noise without losing real catches.

Sources

  • Sigma Detection Format (sigmahq.io). The authoritative Sigma specification and documentation site, the reference to consult for full YAML syntax, field modifiers, and correlation-rule features beyond what this tool's built-in builder exposes.
  • Writing YARA rules (official YARA documentation). The authoritative YARA rule-writing reference: the full string-modifier set, hex-string jumps and alternatives, the complete condition grammar, and the module system. The source this page's supported subset was written against, and where to go for everything the subset deliberately leaves out.
  • YARA-X documentation (VirusTotal). Official docs for YARA-X, VirusTotal's Rust rewrite of YARA, roughly rule-compatible with YARA 4.x but stricter about a few constructs the older parser tolerated. Worth reading alongside the YARA docs when a rule behaves differently between the two engines.
  • Suricata rule documentation. The normative reference for every keyword this page explains, including the sticky-buffer model that replaced the older content-modifier suffixes.
  • Snort 3 Rule Writing Guide. Snort's own manual. The header is identical to Suricata's and the core options overlap almost completely, so this is the place to check when the two engines differ.

Worth using too

  • Uncoder IO (SOC Prime). A free browser-based IDE that translates Sigma rules into 12+ real SIEM/EDR/XDR query languages (Splunk, Elastic, Microsoft Sentinel, and more). Use it once a rule passes here to actually deploy it in a production platform.
  • SigmaHQ Rule Repository. The official, peer-reviewed collection of thousands of community-maintained Sigma detection rules, a ready source of real-world rules to paste into this tester and validate against your own sample log events.
  • Chainsaw (WithSecure Labs). A free, actively maintained command-line tool that runs Sigma rules directly against real Windows Event Log (EVTX) artifacts, a next step from this tool's sample-event testing when you need to hunt across an actual forensic dataset.
  • YARAify (abuse.ch / Spamhaus). A free platform for scanning files against a large public collection of YARA rules, and for publishing your own through YARAhub: the natural next step once a rule works here and you want to see how it behaves against real corpus data.
  • Awesome YARA (InQuest). A large, actively curated index of YARA rule sets, editors, linters, scanning frameworks and style guides. The fastest way to find real published rules to study, or a rule-authoring tool that fits your workflow.
  • signature-base (Florian Roth). A long-running open collection of YARA rules and IOCs written for low false-positive rates, released under the Detection Rule License. A good corpus of real, production-quality rules to read for authoring conventions.
  • Emerging Threats open ruleset. Thousands of real, maintained rules to read. The fastest way to develop a feel for the idiom is to paste a few of these in and see how experienced authors scope and prefilter them.

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