CyberKit

Threat intel / Malware and ransomware

SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to reach MSP customer machines

A toolkit called SCKit uses managed service providers' ScreenConnect instances to install rogue clients on customer machines, then waits for a technician to connect.

High severity. Active. Moderate confidence. First reported 13 Nov 2026, last activity 13 Nov 2026. Briefing updated 17 Nov 2026.

AI-written summaries of public reporting, each checked against at least two sources from different publishers. Check the sources before you act. Last refreshed 2026-11-18 14:09 UTC. How this is made.

What is not settled: Every fact in the body comes from Microsoft's November 13 post, read through a summarizing fetch, not line by line. BleepingComputer, Field Effect and the Cloud Security Alliance were seen only as search excerpts, so they corroborate the campaign and nothing more here. Victim counts reported by other outlets are left out because they were not read. Microsoft names no actor, no victim count and no MITRE ATT&CK technique. The fixed version comes from Microsoft's post, and the ConnectWise bulletin was not opened. CISA's KEV catalog could not be checked from this environment, so no kev value is recorded for CVE-2026-84869.

In plain words

What happened

Attackers got into cloud-hosted ScreenConnect instances that IT support companies use to help their customers. They used the remote-control feature to install an extra client on customer machines, and a kit called SCKit to keep it running.

Who is behind it

Microsoft does not name the group. It refers only to threat actors and gives no tracking name.

What they want

Microsoft does not state a goal. The kit is built to reach customer machines through the support company's own tool, and to take the browser sessions of technicians who connect.

What they did

Microsoft describes rogue ScreenConnect clients installed by remote command, a launcher that fetches an encrypted toolkit, persistence through scheduled tasks and Run entries, and changes to Defender exclusions. The toolkit can redeploy itself during cleanup.

Who is at risk

Managed service providers that run ScreenConnect, their technicians, and the customers whose machines those technicians support.

What to do

  • Check that every ScreenConnect client is version 26.6.5 or later. Console updates do not update clients by themselves.
  • Review ScreenConnect clients, scheduled tasks and Run entries that you did not install.
  • Revoke ScreenConnect and identity-provider sessions from a clean device, and rotate any credentials that may have been exposed.
  • Do not run a cleanup script recovered from the kit. Microsoft warns it can start the deployment again.
The technical version, for hunting and patching

What happened

Microsoft reports SCKit as a worm-like toolkit with two routes. One installs an extra, attacker-connected ScreenConnect client silently through ScreenConnect commands. The other stages a component, RelayTrap, that replaces the legitimate guest process on a customer endpoint and waits for a technician to connect.

Who is behind it

No actor is named or assigned a Microsoft tracking name. Microsoft separates three parts of the attack: the management server, the technician workstation, and the customer endpoint.

What they want

Microsoft does not state a goal. The technical behavior points at credential theft and lateral movement: RelayTrap targets .ASPXAUTH authentication cookies in Chromium-based browsers, using database queries, memory scanning, and DPAPI decryption, and the toolkit tries to push payloads through the victim's management console to other managed devices.

What they did

Observed behavior includes ScreenConnect-issued commands that launch cmd.exe, PowerShell or curl.exe, a batch launcher and a decoder for an encrypted bundle, scheduled tasks and Run registry entries that run scripts from ProgramData, Defender path exclusions for temp or installer paths, and hidden PowerShell processes that run and delete temporary scripts. Microsoft names Defender alerts including Suspicious command execution via ScreenConnect and Suspicious DPAPI Activity.

Who is at risk

MSPs and their technician workstations are the highest-value targets because one compromised console can reach many managed devices. Customer endpoints behind those consoles are exposed as well.

What to do

  • Confirm every ScreenConnect client on technician workstations and customer endpoints is 26.6.5 or later. Keep the RMM+ extension disabled and review its configuration and install history, as Microsoft advises.
  • Hunt for the behaviors above: ScreenConnect commands spawning shells, Run keys and scheduled tasks launching scripts from ProgramData, and changes to Defender exclusions.
  • Investigate suspect devices from an out-of-band channel, such as Defender for Endpoint live response, and include technician workstations in scope.
  • Preserve console and endpoint evidence before remediating. Rebuild any device whose integrity cannot be established.

Vulnerabilities

CVEs in this briefing
CVEProductCVSSCISA KEVFixed in
CVE-2026-84869ConnectWise ScreenConnect clientNot checked26.6.5

Sectors: Managed service providers, Technology. Regions: Global.

Open next

Sources

Revision history

  • 2026-11-17: First published.

Newer: Attackers run open-source agentic pentesting frameworks in live intrusions. Older: Fake Microsoft 365 outage notices push users to a "Restore Messages" link.