Intel archive / Techniques and trends
Device code phishing: a sign-in that hands over your account
Victims type a code into Microsoft's real sign-in page and pass MFA themselves, and the attacker gets the session. A phishing kit called EvilTokens made it mass-market in 2026.
High severity. Active. High confidence. First reported 15 Feb 2026, last activity 22 Sep 2026. Briefing updated 27 Sep 2026.
AI-written summaries of public reporting, each checked against at least two sources from different publishers. Check the sources before you act. Last refreshed 2026-11-18 14:09 UTC. How this is made.
In plain words
What happened
A phishing email sends you to a page that shows a code and a link to the genuine Microsoft sign-in page. You enter the code and approve MFA, and that approval signs in the attacker's device, not yours.
Who is behind it
Criminals using a rented phishing kit called EvilTokens, and state groups such as Midnight Blizzard using the same trick.
What they want
Inbox access to redirect payments (business email compromise) or to spy.
What they did
Microsoft counts more than 12,000 inboxes compromised at over 10,000 organizations through EvilTokens before it disrupted the service in September 2026.
Who is at risk
Anyone using Microsoft 365 where the organization has not blocked this sign-in method.
What to do
- If a message asks you to enter a code at microsoft.com/devicelogin and you are not setting up a TV or device yourself, do not.
- Admins: block the device code sign-in flow unless you truly need it.
The technical version, for hunting and patching
What happened
Abuse of the OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant: the attacker requests a device code, the victim completes genuine MFA at microsoft.com/devicelogin, and tokens are issued to the attacker's client. MFA is redirected, not bypassed.
Who is behind it
EvilTokens PhaaS (from February 2026; $1,500 plus $500/month) and its customers; also nation-state clusters such as Storm-2372/Storm-2945 (Midnight Blizzard).
What they want
Refresh tokens for durable mailbox and Graph access; BEC and espionage.
What they did
Live code generation with 3 to 5 second polling; within about 10 minutes, device registration to obtain a Primary Refresh Token; Graph reconnaissance; AI-assisted triage of inboxes for finance and executive targets; hiding inbox rules.
Who is at risk
Entra ID tenants that allow the device code flow broadly and lack token protection or compliant-device requirements.
What to do
- Block device code flow with a Conditional Access authentication-flows policy; allow-list only the devices that need it.
- Hunt sign-in logs for authenticationProtocol deviceCode from users who never use it, then new device registrations.
- On suspicion: revoke refresh tokens (revokeSignInSessions), disable the rogue device, remove inbox rules.
- Move to phishing-resistant MFA and require compliant devices for mail.
Actors
- EvilTokens operators and customers
- Midnight Blizzard
ATT&CK techniques
- T1566.002: Phishing
- T1528: Steal Application Access Token
- T1098.005: Account Manipulation
- T1564.008: Hide Artifacts
- T1114: Email Collection
Sectors: Financial services, Construction, Real estate, Higher education, Healthcare. Regions: United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, India, France.
Open next
Sources
- Unmasking EvilTokens: Getting to the root of device code phishing, Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-09-22 (vendor)
- EvilTokens device-code phishing kit totally more evil than we all thought, The Register, 2026-07-01 (news)
- EvilTokens: A phishing attack that doesn't steal your password, ESET WeLiveSecurity (vendor)
Revision history
- 2026-09-27: First published.
Newer: Storm-2570: one ransomware affiliate, four brands. Older: VMware vCenter CVE-2026-59310: espionage, now ransomware.