CyberKit

Access Token Manipulation

Also called Token Impersonation, Token Theft.

Stealing or forging Windows tokens to act as another account.

What it is

Manipulating Windows access tokens, the objects that carry a process's security context, by stealing, duplicating, or impersonating them so code runs under a different user's identity. This includes impersonating a logged-on admin or a service account.

Why it matters

Token abuse lets an attacker assume privileged identities without knowing their passwords, enabling stealthy privilege escalation and lateral movement. Process privilege and impersonation telemetry, plus unexpected token use, are the signals to watch.

In practice

An attacker with SYSTEM duplicates a domain admin's token from an active session to run commands as that admin against remote hosts.

What to look for

  • A process running as SYSTEM or another user whose parent ran as someone else.
  • Logon type 9 events, which come from runas with netonly or token creation.
  • Use of privileges such as SeDebugPrivilege or SeImpersonatePrivilege by unusual processes.

Common mistake

Trusting the user name in a process listing. With a stolen token, the name is real; the parent and logon session tell the story.

Practice it nearby

CyberKit has no tool for this term itself. These are the closest places to practice it.

In the field

Well-known tools where this shows up on the job. They are listed to show the landscape, not as a recommendation.

  • CrowdStrike Falcon Commercial

    An EDR agent that records process, file and network activity on each host and flags this kind of behavior.

  • Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Commercial

    Microsoft's EDR, with advanced hunting tables you can query for this activity across Windows, macOS and Linux.

  • Velociraptor Open source

    Collects and hunts for artifacts across many hosts at once, often during live response. Our notes.

  • Sysmon Free

    Free Windows logging of process starts, network connections and more, which many detections rely on. Our notes.

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Sources