CyberKit

COM Hijacking

Also called Component Object Model Hijacking.

Redirecting a registered COM object to attacker code via the registry.

What it is

Abusing the Windows Component Object Model by altering registry entries so that a referenced COM object resolves to attacker-controlled code instead of the legitimate component. When an application invokes the object, the malicious code runs.

Why it matters

COM hijacking is a quiet persistence and execution technique because it rides on normal application behavior and lives in often-ignored registry keys. Comparing per-user and system COM registrations is a reliable way to surface it.

In practice

A user-writable registry key is modified so a common COM object loads a malicious library whenever a scheduled application starts.

What to look for

  • New CLSID keys under HKCU that override entries in HKLM.
  • InprocServer32 values pointing at DLLs in user-writable paths.
  • Explorer or Office loading a DLL that no installer put there.

Common mistake

Only looking in HKLM. The hijack works because the per-user hive is checked first.

Practice it nearby

CyberKit has no tool for this term itself. These are the closest places to practice it.

In the field

Well-known tools where this shows up on the job. They are listed to show the landscape, not as a recommendation.

  • Atomic Red Team Open source

    Small, scripted tests mapped to ATT&CK techniques, used to check whether a detection fires.

  • ATT&CK Navigator Open source

    Lays techniques out on the ATT&CK matrix so teams can mark coverage, gaps and threat profiles.

  • Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Commercial

    Tags its alerts with the ATT&CK techniques it observed on the host.

  • Sysmon Free

    Supplies the host telemetry that most technique detections are written against. Our notes.

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Sources