CyberKit

Constrained Delegation Abuse

Abusing S4U delegation to impersonate users to allowed services.

What it is

Abuse of Kerberos constrained delegation, where a service is permitted to obtain tickets to specific back-end services on behalf of a user via the S4U extensions. If an attacker controls a delegating account, they can request tickets impersonating arbitrary users to those services.

Why it matters

It allows impersonation of high-value users, including domain admins, to the configured target services without their credentials, and protocol-transition variants do not even require the user to authenticate first. The allowed-to-delegate-to list defines the blast radius.

In practice

After compromising a web service account configured for constrained delegation, an attacker forges a ticket impersonating an administrator to a database it is allowed to delegate to.

What to look for

  • S4U2Self and S4U2Proxy requests from service accounts.
  • Service tickets for privileged users that those users never asked for.
  • Delegation settings pointing at sensitive services like LDAP or CIFS on DCs.

Common mistake

Thinking constrained means safe. If the delegating account is compromised, it can impersonate anyone to the allowed services.

Practice it nearby

CyberKit has no tool for this term itself. These are the closest places to practice it.

In the field

Well-known tools where this shows up on the job. They are listed to show the landscape, not as a recommendation.

  • Microsoft Defender for Identity Commercial

    Watches domain controller traffic and events for attacks such as Kerberoasting and DCSync.

  • BloodHound Open source

    Maps attack paths through Active Directory, the same view an attacker builds.

  • Splunk Enterprise Security Commercial

    Where many teams search domain controller logs, such as Kerberos ticket events, for these attacks.

Read next

Sources