CyberKit

Unconstrained Delegation Abuse

Harvesting cached TGTs from a host trusted for unconstrained delegation.

What it is

Abuse of a computer or service configured for unconstrained Kerberos delegation, which causes users authenticating to it to forward their full ticket-granting tickets. An attacker who controls such a host can capture and reuse those TGTs.

Why it matters

If a domain controller or privileged user can be coerced into authenticating to a compromised delegation host, their TGT is captured and replayed for domain-wide compromise. Auditing which systems hold unconstrained delegation is a critical hardening step.

In practice

An attacker who owns a print server flagged for unconstrained delegation coerces a domain controller to connect, captures its TGT, and impersonates it.

What to look for

  • Computers other than domain controllers trusted for unconstrained delegation.
  • Privileged accounts authenticating to those hosts.
  • Coerced authentication, such as print spooler calls, from a DC to that host.

Common mistake

Leaving the setting on old servers. Any admin who logs in there leaves a reusable TGT behind.

Practice it nearby

CyberKit has no tool for this term itself. These are the closest places to practice it.

In the field

Well-known tools where this shows up on the job. They are listed to show the landscape, not as a recommendation.

  • Microsoft Defender for Identity Commercial

    Watches domain controller traffic and events for attacks such as Kerberoasting and DCSync.

  • BloodHound Open source

    Maps attack paths through Active Directory, the same view an attacker builds.

  • Splunk Enterprise Security Commercial

    Where many teams search domain controller logs, such as Kerberos ticket events, for these attacks.

Read next

Sources