CyberKit

Golden Ticket

A forged Kerberos TGT minted from the stolen krbtgt key.

What it is

A forged Kerberos ticket-granting ticket created using the password hash of the domain's krbtgt account. With that key an attacker can mint TGTs for any user, including fabricated ones, with arbitrary group membership and lifetime.

Why it matters

It grants persistent, domain-wide impersonation that survives password resets of normal accounts, because only rotating the krbtgt secret (twice) invalidates it. Forged tickets can show impossible lifetimes or non-existent accounts, which are the forensic tells.

In practice

Responders find logons authenticated by tickets with a ten-year lifetime referencing an account that was never created, pointing straight to a golden ticket.

What to look for

  • Tickets with unusual lifetimes, such as ten years.
  • Service ticket requests with no matching TGT request on a domain controller.
  • Account names or groups in tickets that do not match AD.

Common mistake

Resetting the krbtgt password once. It must be reset twice, with time between, to invalidate forged tickets.

Practice it nearby

CyberKit has no tool for this term itself. These are the closest places to practice it.

In the field

Well-known tools where this shows up on the job. They are listed to show the landscape, not as a recommendation.

  • Microsoft Defender for Identity Commercial

    Watches domain controller traffic and events for attacks such as Kerberoasting and DCSync.

  • BloodHound Open source

    Maps attack paths through Active Directory, the same view an attacker builds.

  • Splunk Enterprise Security Commercial

    Where many teams search domain controller logs, such as Kerberos ticket events, for these attacks.

Read next

  • Silver Ticket: A forged Kerberos service ticket signed with a service account's key.
  • Diamond Ticket: Modifying a legitimately issued Kerberos ticket instead of forging one.
  • DCSync: Impersonating a domain controller to pull password hashes via replication.

Sources