DCSync
Impersonating a domain controller to pull password hashes via replication.
What it is
An attack that abuses the directory-replication protocol (DRSUAPI) to request account password data from a domain controller, as if the attacker were another DC. With the right replication rights it can extract the hashes of any account, including krbtgt.
Why it matters
It harvests credentials without running code on a domain controller or touching LSASS, so endpoint defenses may miss it; the signal lives in replication requests from non-DC hosts. Recovering the krbtgt hash this way enables golden-ticket persistence.
In practice
Threat hunters flag a workstation issuing directory-replication requests to a domain controller, a privilege no normal client should exercise.
What to look for
- Event 4662 with replication rights GUIDs from an account that is not a domain controller.
- Replication requests coming from a workstation IP.
- Accounts granted Replicating Directory Changes All.
Common mistake
Allowlisting by account name. Check the source host; only domain controllers should replicate.
Practice it nearby
CyberKit has no tool for this term itself. These are the closest places to practice it.
- Cloud Identity Case
A cloud account acting out of character: read its CloudTrail records and sign-ins, name the attack, and pick the containment.
- Event Log Reader
Read a binary .evtx file or pasted event XML, with logon types, NTSTATUS codes and the Keywords mask decoded.
In the field
Well-known tools where this shows up on the job. They are listed to show the landscape, not as a recommendation.
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Microsoft Defender for Identity Commercial
Watches domain controller traffic and events for attacks such as Kerberoasting and DCSync.
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BloodHound Open source
Maps attack paths through Active Directory, the same view an attacker builds.
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Splunk Enterprise Security Commercial
Where many teams search domain controller logs, such as Kerberos ticket events, for these attacks.
Read next
- DCShadow: Registering a rogue domain controller to push malicious AD changes.
- Golden Ticket: A forged Kerberos TGT minted from the stolen krbtgt key.
- SAM/LSA Secrets Extraction: Pulling local hashes and service secrets from the registry.