CyberKit

DCSync

Impersonating a domain controller to pull password hashes via replication.

What it is

An attack that abuses the directory-replication protocol (DRSUAPI) to request account password data from a domain controller, as if the attacker were another DC. With the right replication rights it can extract the hashes of any account, including krbtgt.

Why it matters

It harvests credentials without running code on a domain controller or touching LSASS, so endpoint defenses may miss it; the signal lives in replication requests from non-DC hosts. Recovering the krbtgt hash this way enables golden-ticket persistence.

In practice

Threat hunters flag a workstation issuing directory-replication requests to a domain controller, a privilege no normal client should exercise.

What to look for

  • Event 4662 with replication rights GUIDs from an account that is not a domain controller.
  • Replication requests coming from a workstation IP.
  • Accounts granted Replicating Directory Changes All.

Common mistake

Allowlisting by account name. Check the source host; only domain controllers should replicate.

Practice it nearby

CyberKit has no tool for this term itself. These are the closest places to practice it.

In the field

Well-known tools where this shows up on the job. They are listed to show the landscape, not as a recommendation.

  • Microsoft Defender for Identity Commercial

    Watches domain controller traffic and events for attacks such as Kerberoasting and DCSync.

  • BloodHound Open source

    Maps attack paths through Active Directory, the same view an attacker builds.

  • Splunk Enterprise Security Commercial

    Where many teams search domain controller logs, such as Kerberos ticket events, for these attacks.

Read next

  • DCShadow: Registering a rogue domain controller to push malicious AD changes.
  • Golden Ticket: A forged Kerberos TGT minted from the stolen krbtgt key.
  • SAM/LSA Secrets Extraction: Pulling local hashes and service secrets from the registry.

Sources