CyberKit

Interrupt Descriptor Table Hooking

Also called IDT Hooking.

Hijacking interrupt handlers by editing the IDT in memory.

What it is

A technique that modifies entries in the interrupt descriptor table, the structure mapping interrupt and exception vectors to their handler routines, so an attacker's code runs when a chosen interrupt fires. The altered descriptors point at code outside the expected handlers.

Why it matters

Because interrupts are fundamental to system operation, hooking them gives a rootkit a stealthy, low-level execution and interception point that ordinary tools never inspect. Comparing IDT handler addresses against known-good modules in a memory image exposes the tampering.

In practice

An IDT entry whose handler address fell inside an unbacked memory region instead of the kernel, flagging a low-level rootkit.

What to look for

  • IDT entries pointing outside the kernel or HAL.
  • Entries that differ between processors.
  • Handlers in unfamiliar drivers.

Common mistake

Flagging virtualization software as malware. Hypervisors and some security tools touch low level structures too.

Practice it nearby

CyberKit has no tool for this term itself. These are the closest places to practice it.

In the field

Well-known tools where this shows up on the job. They are listed to show the landscape, not as a recommendation.

  • Volatility 3 Open source

    A widely used open source framework for analyzing memory images with plugins. Our notes.

  • Velociraptor Open source

    Can collect memory and query live process memory across many hosts. Our notes.

  • CrowdStrike Falcon Commercial

    EDR agents watch memory activity on the host, such as injection and unbacked code.

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