CyberKit

System Service Dispatch Table Hooking

Also called SSDT Hooking.

Redirecting system-call entries to attacker code in the kernel.

What it is

A kernel hooking technique that overwrites entries in the system service dispatch table, which maps system-call numbers to their handler routines, so calls are diverted through malicious code first. The redirected entries point outside the legitimate kernel image.

Why it matters

SSDT hooks let a rootkit filter or falsify the results of core system calls, hiding files, processes, or registry keys from anything that asks the kernel. In memory analysis, dispatch-table entries pointing outside known modules are a reliable hooking indicator.

In practice

A system service table entry resolving to an unsigned region rather than the kernel image, revealing a rootkit intercepting directory enumeration.

What to look for

  • SSDT entries pointing outside the kernel image.
  • Entries that point into unfamiliar drivers.
  • Hooks on calls such as NtQuerySystemInformation.

Common mistake

Expecting it on modern 64-bit Windows. PatchGuard blocks most of it, so it shows up mainly on older or tampered systems.

Practice it nearby

CyberKit has no tool for this term itself. These are the closest places to practice it.

In the field

Well-known tools where this shows up on the job. They are listed to show the landscape, not as a recommendation.

  • Volatility 3 Open source

    A widely used open source framework for analyzing memory images with plugins. Our notes.

  • Velociraptor Open source

    Can collect memory and query live process memory across many hosts. Our notes.

  • CrowdStrike Falcon Commercial

    EDR agents watch memory activity on the host, such as injection and unbacked code.

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Sources