Port 5985/tcp: WinRM (Windows Remote Management): HTTP
Category: Remote Management & Administration. Range: registered. Status: iana registered.
What runs here
Microsoft's implementation of the WS-Management (WS-Man) standard; it is the transport underneath PowerShell Remoting (Enter-PSSession, Invoke-Command) and WMI-over-WinRM. Port 5985 is the default plaintext-HTTP listener. The SOAP payload itself is typically still protected at the message level by Kerberos/NTLM in a default domain configuration, but the outer HTTP channel is not TLS.
Why it matters
WinRM is PowerShell Remoting's transport, making it both a core admin-automation channel and an equally capable lateral-movement path once an attacker has a valid credential, and it is frequently less closely monitored than RDP, since it never presents an interactive desktop. On the target, remote sessions are hosted by wsmprovhost.exe; that process spawning unexpected child processes is a strong lateral-movement signal.
Where you see it
Legitimately: PowerShell Remoting for admin scripts, configuration-management tools (Ansible, Puppet, Chef) targeting Windows over WinRM, System Center. Anomalously/maliciously: Invoke-Command/Enter-PSSession used for post-compromise lateral movement, the Evil-WinRM tool, or WMI queries executed over a WinRM session.
What to look for
| Signal | What it means |
|---|---|
| wsmprovhost.exe as parent process | A WinRM/PowerShell-Remoting session hosts the client's commands under wsmprovhost.exe on the target. Unexpected child processes under it are a strong lateral-movement indicator. |
| 4624 Logon Type 3 + WinRM operational log | Correlating a Network logon (Logon Type 3) with a session-creation entry in the Microsoft-Windows-WinRM/Operational log confirms a remoting session, not just an ordinary network authentication. |
Related ports
ATT&CK techniques
- T1021.006: T1021.006