Port 5986/tcp: WinRM (Windows Remote Management): HTTPS
Category: Remote Management & Administration. Range: registered. Status: iana registered.
What runs here
The same WS-Management/PowerShell Remoting service as port 5985, bound instead to a TLS-wrapped HTTPS listener backed by a certificate. It is the encrypted counterpart, commonly required when remoting across an untrusted network segment or to a non-domain-joined/workgroup host where Kerberos isn't available.
Why it matters
The DFIR relevance mirrors 5985 (it is the same PowerShell Remoting lateral-movement path), but the TLS wrapping means network-level visibility from packet capture can't see into session content at all; evidence has to come from host-side logs (the WinRM operational log, PowerShell Script Block Logging) rather than the wire. An unexpected new HTTPS listener, or one bound to an unexpected certificate, is itself worth investigating.
Where you see it
Legitimately: WinRM configured for certificate-based or CredSSP remoting across a DMZ or to non-domain-joined hosts. Anomalously/maliciously: the same lateral-movement tooling as 5985 but over the encrypted listener, or an attacker adding a new WinRM HTTPS listener for covert remote access.
What to look for
| Signal | What it means |
|---|---|
| Unexpected listener creation | A new entry under winrm enumerate winrm/config/Listener that an admin didn't create, or one bound to a certificate that doesn't trace back to expected PKI issuance, is worth investigating. |
Related ports
- 5985/tcp: WinRM (Windows Remote Management): HTTP
ATT&CK techniques
- T1021.006: T1021.006