Drill Case
Windows Host Case
An alert on a live Windows workstation: read the event logs and the Registry, rebuild the timeline, then decide what to collect.
The case
An endpoint alert fired on a Windows workstation, and the host is still powered on. You have the Security and Sysmon logs, the user's Registry hives, and findings from a few other sources.
Work it the way the evidence arrives: read the events first, then the Registry, then put the findings in order, then make the collection calls. Each stage ends with a short debrief before the next one opens.
- Event logs 10 questions
- Registry 10 questions
- Timeline 10 questions
- Collection 8 questions
What you will be able to do
- Locate the account, source address and logon type in a raw Windows Security event without a parser (Event ID / Sysmon Reference)
- Tell apart same-named fields that appear in different blocks of one event and mean different things
- Recognize the common Security and Sysmon event IDs by what the record contains, not by memorizing a number list
- Map an event to the ATT&CK technique it commonly evidences (ATT&CK Coverage Map)
- Say which execution artifact supports an execution claim, and which only shows presence (Registry Forensics Reference)
- Pick the key that answers a given investigative question, and name its catch (Registry Forensics Reference)
- Read a decoded UserAssist entry and place it on a timeline (Registry Value Decoder)
- Order Registry work so the timeline it produces is defensible
- Order findings from mixed artifact types by when the underlying events happened, not by when each artifact was written
- Pick the artifact that can answer a given question, across Windows, Linux, macOS and network sources (ATT&CK Data Sources)
- Separate what an artifact proves from what it only looks like it proves (Registry Forensics Reference)
- Treat a gap as a coverage question before treating it as a finding, and state coverage alongside conclusions
- Order evidence sources by volatility for a given scenario, including when circumstance overrides it (Order of Volatility)
- Say which source answers a given question, and which cannot
- Name what a collection decision costs, not only what it gains (Order of Volatility)
- Record the things that make a finding defensible later: hashes, footprint, where output was written
Read first: Event ID / Sysmon Reference, Registry Forensics Reference, ATT&CK Data Sources, Order of Volatility.
Notes for teaching it
- The single most transferable skill here is reading the block structure, so it is worth stopping the class on the first question where a field name appears twice.
- Every log shown is the real sample from that event's own reference page, so a learner can open the reference alongside and see the same record annotated in full.
- The ATT&CK-mapping questions are a minority of the run and assume no prior ATT&CK knowledge: they link out per question, so they work as an introduction rather than a gate.
- Question 1 is the one to build a session around. Most learners answer "it ran", which is the exact claim that gets into real reports and does not survive scrutiny.
- The collection question catches people who have only ever worked from a live host. If a class has never lost data to a missing transaction log, this is a cheap way to make the point.
- No hive parsing is needed. The drill presents every artifact already decoded, so it tests reasoning rather than tooling.
- Question 8 is the one that reliably surprises people: conn.log is written LAST, after every protocol log describing what happened inside the connection. It is the natural place to introduce the uid join key.
- The macOS question has a deliberate trap: a certificate issue date is not an event on the host. Worth letting a group get it wrong before explaining it.
- The final question is not really a question. If a group is short on time, skip an ordering rather than that one.
- The reboot question lands hardest with people who have worked a helpdesk. It is worth pausing on, because it reframes a routine act as evidence destruction.
- The production-database scenario is the useful one for experienced analysts: the textbook order is not the working order once approvals and retention are involved.
- Two questions have no clean answer and are meant to be argued about, particularly isolate-first versus capture-first. That argument is the lesson.
Terms behind it
- Windows Event Log: Windows' record of logons, process starts, and system activity.
- Registry Hives: On-disk files backing the Windows registry, each holding distinct forensic value.
- Prefetch: A Windows artifact proving a program ran, and when.
- Order of Volatility: Collect the most fleeting evidence first, before it disappears.
- Timeline Analysis: Ordering filesystem and artifact timestamps to reconstruct events.
- Memory Acquisition: Capturing a live system's RAM into an image for analysis.
Worksheet
Every question on one page, to print or to read without JavaScript. The answer key has the answers and why.
Event logs, 10 questions
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Triage this raw Windows log for Event ID 4624 ("An account was successfully logged on", channel: Security). Read it and type what was actually recorded for each field below.
An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: WORKSTATION01$ Account Domain: CORP Logon ID: 0x3E7 Logon Information: Logon Type: 3 Restricted Admin Mode: - Virtual Account: No Elevated Token: No Impersonation Level: Impersonation New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-3623811015-3361044348-30300820-1104 Account Name: jsmith Account Domain: CORP Logon ID: 0x3E7F2A1 Linked Logon ID: 0x0 Network Account Name: - Network Account Domain: - Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000} Process Information: Process ID: 0x0 Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: WORKSTATION01 Source Network Address: 203.0.113.10 Source Port: 49234 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): NTLM V2 Key Length: 128 -
Triage this raw Sysmon log for Event ID 11 ("FileCreate", channel: Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational). Read it and type what was actually recorded for each field below.
File created: RuleName: - UtcTime: 2024-01-15 14:42:33.012 ProcessGuid: {A1B2C3D4-E5F6-4A5B-8C9D-0E1F2A3B0006} ProcessId: 7788 Image: C:\Users\jsmith\AppData\Local\Temp\invoice.exe TargetFilename: C:\Users\jsmith\AppData\Roaming\update.dll CreationUtcTime: 2024-01-15 14:42:33.012 User: CORP\jsmith -
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique ID does Event ID 4720 ("A user account was created", channel: Security) most commonly map to? (e.g. "T1078")
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Triage this raw Windows log for Event ID 1102 ("The audit log was cleared", channel: Security). Read it and type what was actually recorded for each field below.
The audit log was cleared. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-3623811015-3361044348-30300820-500 Account Name: administrator Domain Name: CORP Logon ID: 0x3E7F2A1
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Triage this raw Sysmon log for Event ID 22 ("DNSEvent (DNS query)", channel: Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational). Read it and type what was actually recorded for each field below.
Dns query: RuleName: - UtcTime: 2024-02-11 09:43:12.204 ProcessGuid: {a1b2c3d4-1234-65a1-0000-001122334466} ProcessId: 7148 QueryName: update.example.com QueryStatus: 0 QueryResults: ::ffff:198.51.100.42; Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -
Which MITRE ATT&CK technique ID does Event ID 10 ("ProcessAccess", channel: Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational) most commonly map to? (e.g. "T1078")
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Triage this raw Windows log for Event ID 4625 ("An account failed to log on", channel: Security). Read it and type what was actually recorded for each field below.
An account failed to log on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: - Account Domain: - Logon ID: 0x0 Logon Type: 3 Account For Which Logon Failed: Security ID: S-1-0-0 Account Name: jsmith Account Domain: CORP Failure Information: Failure Reason: Unknown user name or bad password. Status: 0xC000006D Sub Status: 0xC000006A Process Information: Caller Process ID: 0x0 Caller Process Name: - Network Information: Workstation Name: WORKSTATION01 Source Network Address: 203.0.113.15 Source Port: 49523 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: NtLmSsp Authentication Package: NTLM Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0
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Triage this raw Windows log for Event ID 4672 ("Special privileges assigned to new logon", channel: Security). Read it and type what was actually recorded for each field below.
Special privileges assigned to new logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-3457937927-2839227994-823803824-500 Account Name: administrator Account Domain: CORP Logon ID: 0x8A2F1 Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeDebugPrivilege SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
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Which MITRE ATT&CK technique ID does Event ID 7045 ("A service was installed in the system", channel: System) most commonly map to? (e.g. "T1078")
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Triage this raw Sysmon log for Event ID 3 ("Network connection", channel: Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational). Read it and type what was actually recorded for each field below.
Network connection detected: RuleName: - UtcTime: 2024-01-15 14:36:02.789 ProcessGuid: {5a8f3c2b-7e41-65b0-1200-000000001b00} ProcessId: 4521 Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe User: CORP\jsmith Protocol: tcp Initiated: true SourceIsIpv6: false SourceIp: 198.51.100.23 SourceHostname: WKSTN-JSMITH.corp.local SourcePort: 51322 SourcePortName: - DestinationIsIpv6: false DestinationIp: 203.0.113.10 DestinationHostname: - DestinationPort: 443 DestinationPortName: https
Registry, 10 questions
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ShimCache on a compromised host lists C:\ProgramData\Intel\IntelSvc.exe. The binary is gone. What does this entry establish?
- The file existed on this system at some point, with the file timestamp shown
- The file was executed at the time shown in the entry
- The file was executed at least once, though the time is unknown
- A user double-clicked the file from Explorer
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Sort each artifact by whether it can support a claim that a program actually ran.
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This UserAssist entry has been decoded. Pull the three facts you would put in a timeline row.
Key : NTUSER.DAT\...\UserAssist\{CEBFF5CD-ACE2-4F4F-9178-9926F41749EA}\Count Value name (ROT13) : P:\CebtenzQngn\Vagry\VagryFip.rkr Decoded name : C:\ProgramData\Intel\IntelSvc.exe Run count : 9 Focus time : 2h 14m 33s Last executed : 2026-03-02T21:47:09Z -
Match each investigative question to the Registry key that answers it.
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You copied SYSTEM, SOFTWARE and every NTUSER.DAT off a running host. Your parser shows nothing from the last two days. What is the most likely explanation?
- The transaction logs were not collected, so recent writes have not been replayed into the hives
- The Registry stops recording activity while a host is running
- The hives were collected from the wrong ControlSet
- Two days of history is the normal retention for these hives
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What does this Winlogon configuration tell you?
Key : SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon Shell : explorer.exe Userinit: C:\Windows\system32\userinit.exe,C:\ProgramData\Intel\IntelSvc.exe
- A second binary has been appended to Userinit and will run at every interactive logon
- Nothing unusual; Userinit legitimately holds two entries
- The Shell value has been hijacked
- The trailing comma indicates corruption in the value
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Defender exclusions on a compromised host list C:\ProgramData\Intel\ and the extension .bin. Why is this one of the most useful findings on the box?
- It names the directory and file type the attacker intended to use
- It proves Defender was disabled entirely
- It shows the host was never scanned
- It is a default exclusion and carries no information
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Put these steps in the order that produces a defensible Registry timeline.
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You need ShellBags showing which removable drives a user browsed. Which hive do you need?
- UsrClass.dat, from the user's AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows
- NTUSER.DAT, from the root of the user profile
- SOFTWARE, from System32\config
- SYSTEM, from System32\config
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BAM shows no entry for a binary you believe ran three weeks ago. What is the correct reading?
- BAM keeps roughly a week of history, so its silence says nothing about three weeks ago
- The binary did not run
- BAM was cleared by the attacker
- The binary ran under a different user SID
Timeline, 10 questions
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One Windows host, one intrusion. Put these findings in the order the underlying events happened.
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Match each question to the artifact that actually answers it.
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A single executable, C:\ProgramData\Intel\IntelSvc.exe, runs once. Order these artifacts by the moment each one records.
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Your timeline has a four-hour gap on one host with no events at all. What is the FIRST thing to establish?
- Whether the sources covering that window were collecting, and what their retention is
- Whether the attacker cleared the logs
- Whether the host was powered off
- Whether the timestamps in that range use a different epoch
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A phishing case on a macOS laptop. Order what happened, using what each artifact records.
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Sort each artifact by the strongest claim it can support on its own.
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A Linux server. Order these records by when the underlying events happened.
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Zeek logs for one exfiltration. Order these by when Zeek would have written them.
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Two events on different hosts are 90 seconds apart in your timeline, and you want to say one caused the other. What has to be true first?
- Both hosts' clocks are reconciled to one reference, and the offset between them is recorded
- Both events are in the same log format
- Both events involve the same account
- Both hosts are in the same domain
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Your timeline is complete and internally consistent. What does that establish?
- That the events you collected are consistent with your account, and nothing about the events you did not collect
- That your reconstruction of the incident is correct
- That no other explanation fits the evidence
- That the scope of the intrusion is now known
Collection, 8 questions
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A workstation is suspected of running a backdoor and is still powered on. Order these by what you collect first.
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A helpdesk technician rebooted the suspect host before you arrived. Which evidence did that specifically destroy?
- Physical memory, and with it injected code, decrypted configuration and cleartext credentials
- The filesystem timeline
- The Windows event logs
- Registry persistence keys
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Where should a memory image be written, and why?
- To removable media or a network share, because writing locally overwrites unallocated space
- To the suspect system disk, so the acquisition is self-contained
- To a new partition on the suspect disk, which keeps it isolated
- Anywhere, as long as the file is hashed afterwards
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Match each question to the source that actually answers it.
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A production database server is suspected of exfiltrating data. It cannot be taken offline without executive approval. Order the work you can start now.
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You isolate the host from the network before capturing anything. What did you gain and lose?
- Gained: stopped ongoing damage. Lost: live C2 connections, and you may have tipped off anything watching for connectivity loss
- Gained and lost nothing; isolation has no forensic effect
- Gained: preserved memory. Lost: disk evidence
- Gained: preserved the network connection table. Lost: nothing
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Your report will say a file was deleted from a temp directory. What has to be recorded at acquisition for that to hold up?
- A hash taken at the point of collection, verified again after transfer
- The name of the analyst who found it
- A screenshot of the directory listing
- The tool version used to carve the file
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Why does running your own triage commands need recording?
- They create processes, open handles and write artifacts that the next analyst could otherwise attribute to the attacker
- Licensing requires it
- It is only needed when the tools are commercial
- It is a formality with no analytical effect
Next: Phishing Case. All drills