CyberKit

Intel archive / Malware and ransomware

Storm-2570: one ransomware affiliate, four brands

Microsoft tracks an affiliate that deploys Qilin, DragonForce, Anubis and BERT ransomware with the same tools every time, which makes it catchable before the encryption.

High severity. Active. High confidence. First reported 24 Sep 2026, last activity 24 Sep 2026. Briefing updated 27 Sep 2026.

AI-written summaries of public reporting, each checked against at least two sources from different publishers. Check the sources before you act. Last refreshed 2026-11-18 14:09 UTC. How this is made.

In plain words

What happened

Ransomware is often run by 'affiliates' who rent the malware. Microsoft found one affiliate that switches between four ransomware brands but always breaks in and moves around the same way.

Who is behind it

A group Microsoft calls Storm-2570, tracked since April 2025.

What they want

Money: steal data first, then encrypt systems, and charge for both.

What they did

Used remote-support tools to stay in, stole passwords, spread across networks, switched off Defender, copied data to the cloud, then deployed ransomware.

Who is at risk

Mid-size and large organizations in North America and Europe, across almost every sector.

What to do

  • Allow only approved remote-support tools and require MFA on them.
  • Turn on tamper protection so security tools cannot be switched off.
The technical version, for hunting and patching

What happened

Microsoft (24 September 2026) profiles Storm-2570, an affiliate operating across the Qilin, DragonForce, Anubis and BERT RaaS ecosystems with consistent tradecraft and overlapping infrastructure.

Who is behind it

Storm-2570, tracked since April 2025. Initial access remains unconfirmed.

What they want

Double extortion: exfiltration first, then encryption.

What they did

RMM (MeshAgent, Atera, ScreenConnect, Splashtop, NinjaRMM); discovery with NetScan and Nmap; lateral movement via PsExec, Impacket, NetExec and RDP; credential theft with Mimikatz, LaZagne, pypykatz and ntdsutil (NTDS.dit); Defender tampering; exfiltration with Rclone and s5cmd.

Who is at risk

Estates tolerating multiple RMM products, without tamper protection, or with domain-controller access reachable from workstations.

What to do

  • Enable tenant-wide tamper protection and ASR rules (credential theft from LSASS, PsExec/WMI process creation).
  • Inventory and block unapproved RMM; alert on first-seen RMM installs.
  • Hunt for ntdsutil IFM creation, Rclone/s5cmd execution and large cloud-storage egress.
  • Treat the pre-encryption behavior as the detection window: it is the same across all four brands.

Actors

  • Storm-2570

ATT&CK techniques

Sectors: Healthcare, Education, Government, Financial services, Manufacturing, Energy. Regions: United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Spain, Netherlands.

Open next

Sources

Revision history

  • 2026-09-27: First published.

Newer: JadePuffer (Storm-3168): AI-agent-driven Azure destruction. Older: Device code phishing: a sign-in that hands over your account.