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JadePuffer (Storm-3168): AI-agent-driven Azure destruction

An actor Microsoft tracks as Storm-3168 used stolen Azure service principal credentials and an AI agent to map and then wipe over 100 storage accounts in about seven minutes.

High severity. Active. Moderate confidence. First reported 1 Jul 2026, last activity 25 Sep 2026. Briefing updated 29 Sep 2026.

AI-written summaries of public reporting, each checked against at least two sources from different publishers. Check the sources before you act. Last refreshed 2026-11-18 14:09 UTC. How this is made.

What is not settled: No ransom note was observed and data exfiltration was not confirmed by Microsoft; this reads as destructive/extortive activity but the group's ultimate objective is not fully established. "JadePuffer" is a researcher nickname, not yet a name MITRE tracks.

In plain words

What happened

Attackers got hold of working Azure credentials, and instead of doing everything by hand, pointed an AI agent at the victim's cloud environment. It quietly mapped everything out for hours, then deleted over 100 storage accounts and tried to delete other services in about seven minutes.

Who is behind it

Tracked by Microsoft as Storm-3168; researchers have nicknamed the activity JadePuffer. It is documented as the first large-scale case of AI-agent-driven destructive cloud activity.

What they want

Disruption and likely extortion: mass-deleting cloud resources looks like a ransomware-style attack even without a ransom note in this incident.

What they did

Compromised two Azure service principals, one of whose credentials had leaked in a public GitHub issue, then used an AI agent to reconnoiter the environment before a fast, automated deletion spree.

Who is at risk

Any organization that has ever committed an Azure credential, even briefly, to a public code repository, or that reuses service principal credentials across environments.

What to do

  • Search your organization's public GitHub history for leaked Azure credentials and rotate anything found immediately.
  • Turn on soft-delete and resource locks for storage accounts, key vaults and other critical Azure resources.
  • Alert on unusual, rapid deletion activity from a service principal; a normal admin does not delete 100 storage accounts in minutes.
The technical version, for hunting and patching

What happened

Storm-3168 ("JadePuffer") compromised two Azure service principals and used an agentic AI workflow to enumerate the tenant, steal storage account keys, and then execute a destructive burst: over 100 Storage accounts deleted along with attempts against Key Vaults, Function Apps, Virtual Machines and App Services, all within roughly seven minutes.

Who is behind it

Storm-3168 (Microsoft designation); publicly nicknamed JadePuffer. Sysdig had separately identified related LLM-driven ransomware activity in July 2026.

What they want

Consistent with extortion or pure disruption; Microsoft did not observe a ransom note or confirm data exfiltration in this incident.

What they did

Initial access via a service principal whose credentials had appeared in a public GitHub issue. Hours of automated reconnaissance and key theft preceded a scripted, AI-agent-directed deletion of storage accounts, a Key Vault, a Function App and an App Service plan in the same resource group.

Who is at risk

Azure tenants with service principal credentials exposed in code repositories, CI/CD logs, or other leak vectors, and without deletion locks or soft-delete protecting critical resources.

What to do

  • Audit public and private repositories for committed Azure secrets; use secret-scanning and rotate on any hit, not just public ones.
  • Apply resource locks (CanNotDelete) and enable soft-delete/purge protection on Storage, Key Vault and other stateful services.
  • Monitor Azure Activity Log for high-velocity delete operations from a single principal and alert on it as a P1.

Actors

  • Storm-3168 (JadePuffer)

ATT&CK techniques

  • T1078: Valid Accounts
  • T1552: Unsecured Credentials
  • T1485: Data Destruction
  • T1531: Account Access Removal

Sectors: Multiple. Regions: Global.

Open next

Sources

Revision history

  • 2026-09-29: First published.

Newer: CVE-2026-35273: unauthenticated RCE in Oracle PeopleSoft. Older: Storm-2570: one ransomware affiliate, four brands.