CyberKit

DCShadow

Registering a rogue domain controller to push malicious AD changes.

What it is

An attack that temporarily registers a rogue domain controller in Active Directory and uses replication to inject arbitrary directory changes. Because the modifications arrive as legitimate replication, they can bypass normal change auditing.

Why it matters

It lets an attacker stealthily alter objects, such as adding SID history or membership, while evading the directory-service audit logs that would catch a normal change. Detection focuses on unexpected server objects and replication metadata.

In practice

An investigator finds an SID-history value that no logged event ever set, traced to a brief rogue-DC registration via DCShadow.

What to look for

  • New server or nTDSDSA objects in the configuration partition.
  • SPNs for replication added to a non-DC computer.
  • Directory changes that appear without matching admin activity in the logs.

Common mistake

Relying on change logs alone. The rogue DC pushes changes through replication, which can skip normal audit events.

Practice it nearby

CyberKit has no tool for this term itself. These are the closest places to practice it.

In the field

Well-known tools where this shows up on the job. They are listed to show the landscape, not as a recommendation.

  • Microsoft Defender for Identity Commercial

    Watches domain controller traffic and events for attacks such as Kerberoasting and DCSync.

  • BloodHound Open source

    Maps attack paths through Active Directory, the same view an attacker builds.

  • Splunk Enterprise Security Commercial

    Where many teams search domain controller logs, such as Kerberos ticket events, for these attacks.

Read next

  • DCSync: Impersonating a domain controller to pull password hashes via replication.
  • SID History Injection: Adding privileged SIDs to an account's history for stealthy access.
  • Golden Ticket: A forged Kerberos TGT minted from the stolen krbtgt key.

Sources